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---Abstract---
Tins study looks into the role of the i~stitution of traditional leadership in post-apartheid 
• .- " ·1 _ 
South Africa. It seeks to critically engage the debate on how to locate the institution 
within the new politico-constitutional framework. This is done with the main objective of 
proposing an altemative to the current state of affairs vis-a.-vis traditional leadership and 
govemance in South Africa. 
In order to clear the ground, the study first deals with the important question of 
democracy in relation to the institution of traditional leadership. In this regard, the study 
unearthed that the institution of traditional leadership is fundamentally undemocratic in 
character, as it is largely based on heredity and devoid of principles of democracy such as 
equality, accountability, etc. 
In order to put matters into perspective the study also delves into the history of the 
institution of traditional leadership with the aim of getting to the role that traditional 
leaders played in various epochs of South Africa's political development. This 
, 
investigatiorl reveals that the denting of the integrity of the institution of traditional 
leadership began with the advent of colonialism and worsened by successive apartheid 
regimes. It is at these stages of development that the institution was subordinated to a 
higher authority that sought to use the institution as an instrument of domination and 
oppression of the black majority. 
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Considering this role, it would seem that the place that the space that the institution 
occupies in the post-apartheid South African governance framework is a compromise. 
The institution plays an advisory role at all levels of government - with their houses in 
..... ,~ -
both national and provincial legislatures, whilst traditional leaders sit as ex-officio 
members on local councils. However, traditional leaders fiercely contest this position as, 
in their view, this limits their powers. 
The main argument of this study is that for traditional leaders to be given an advisory role 
in the current and future governance "framework of the country is a step in the right 
direction, as that serves to insulate the institution from active politics. For that reason, the 
study recommends that the institution of traditional leadership should occupy a cultural 
space in society - meaning that it should be responsible for the preservation of African 
customs and culture. This, therefore, means that the institution is better-placed to advise 
government on cultural and customary aspects of development. Whilst playing this role, 
the institution of traditional leadership should also-be brought into line with democratic 
ways of go,;e,mance . 
.' 
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---Introduction---
The role of the institution of traditional leadership has constantly been changing in the 
~ ''''1-
various epochs of South Africa's political development. Prior to colonialism, African 
societies were organized into small units led by traditional leaders. There was no other 
authority above traditional leaders in terms of the leadership of African polities. The 
system of leadership was very close to the people, connecting from the head of the kraal, 
the induna (headman), to the chief, etc. (Rutsch, 1995: 11). Traditional leaders had 
numerous roles to play, which included taking care of economic, security, legal, and 
social issues in relation to their respective polities. They were basically entrusted with the 
responsibility of ensuring the well-being of their people. 
The advent of colonialism heralded a process of transformation that saw traditional 
leaders being subordinated to the colonial state. Act No. 38 of 1927 placed the institution 
of traditional leadership firmly under the control of the Governor-General. According to 
Rutsch (1995: 11), the Governor-General "had the power to appoint, recognize and 
depose amakhosi and izinduna". It can thus be argued that the Act made the Governor-
I 
General the / supreme traditional leader of South Africa and thereby transformed the 
institution of traditional leadership into an instrument of colonial SUbjugation and 
oppreSSIOn. 
The emergence of the apartheid government in 1948 concretized the instrumentalisation 
of the situation of traditional leaders by ushering in a system of Bantustans, which were 
4 
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meant to compartmentalize the African majority along the lines of ethnicity. Building on 
the foundation laid by the architects of colonial domination, BeDllett (1998: 14) argues 
that the apartheid goverrunent in 1951 grafted new local authorities into existing tribal 
, 
-« '.., ... 
structures in order to give rise to a Bantustan system of goverrunent. The main objective 
of apartheid masterminds was to intensifY the oppression of the black majority, and the 
basic role of traditional leaders (as goverrunent minions) thus remained unchanged in the 
Bantustan system. 
The advent of democracy in South Africa inevitably had far-reaching implications for the 
institution of traditional leadership. The country was faced with the challenge of 
redefining the role of traditional leaders in the new politico-constitutional dispensation -
a dispensation aptly defined by Muthein (1999 : 1) as one characterized by, 
.. . a large-scale transformation from a raCially exclusive apartheid regime 
to a democratic system premised on constitutionalism, rule of law, the 
protection of civil rights and liberties, institutions of accountability, and the 
construction of a new state with a transformative agenda. 
The goverrunent's position with regard to the position of traditional leaders is expressed 
t 
in the constitution, where Section 212 (1) (a) provides that a "National legislation may 
provide for the establishment of houses of traditional leaders". It is worth noting that 
these houses have advisory powers, and that at local goverrunent level traditional leaders 
have an ex-officio status, which places them in a position to advise local councils on 
matters relevant to their (traditional leaders) terrain. 
5 
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Predictably, the new dispensation has provoked controversies from different quarters of 
society. Mcintosh (1995: 65), for example, argues that the fact that traditional leaders' 
role is limited to an advisory one is a step in-the right direction. While Ntsebeza (2000: 
. ~; "~ 
23) dismisses the constitutional provisio-n as being vague, the Congress of Traditional 
Leaders of South Africa (Contralesa), representing the majority of the country's 
traditional leaders, thinks that the constitution limits the power of traditional leaders and 
therefore they argue that traditional leaders' role should be strengthened. 
It is against this background that this study engages the debate about the role of 
traditional leaders in the new South African democratic institutional framework. The aim 
of this research is, therefore, to make a contribution to the debate about the role that the 
institution of traditional leadership should play in a democratic South Africa. The main 
goal of the research is to propose a way forward that could disentangle politicians and 
traditional leaders from the conflict that has almost become a central characteristic of 
their relationship in post-apartheid South Africa. The research further explores ways in 
which the institution can be strengthened as a powerful source of cultural unity within 
i ' 
communities. 
, 
; 
The fact that other scholars have made contributions to this field of research is of 
resourceful importance to this research. It is for that reason that the research draws on the 
work of scholars contained in secondary material such as books, papers, and j oumal 
articles. 
6 
The research largely relies on two schools of thought, viz. the modernist and the 
communitarian. The essence of the modernist methodology is that society is always in a 
state of constant development towards a more modernized fonn and, as such, the 
.1., _ 
adoption of new social values and ways of life is ineluctable. In the context of the debate 
on traditional leaders, Keulder (1998) defines modernists as those scholars who call for a 
major transfonnation of the institution of traditional leaders to meet the requirements of a 
modem democracy. As indicated above, the researcher moves from the idea that the 
existence of the institution of traditional leadership is necessary, but that a modified role 
for this institution is required. Afongsid~ the modernist approach, the researcher utilizes 
the communitarian approach so as to avoid being dismissive of anything associated with 
the institution of traditional leadership. Mamdani (1996: 3) defines the communitarian 
approach as one that calls for "a return to the source" or the "defense of culture". Guided 
by these two theoretical approaches, it is hoped that the study is as objective as possible. 
The study is structured into five chapters. Chapter one provides a discussion on the 
concept deq\ocracy vis-a-vis the institution of traditional leaders. The discussion in this 
chapter lays the theoretical foundation for subsequent chapters by interrogating the 
compatibility'ofthe institution of traditional leadership with democracy. This is followed 
by some reflection, in chapter two, on the role that the institution has played in various 
stages of the country's political development. This historical context provides a 
backgrOlmd to chapter three, which discusses the position that the institution currently 
occupies in the democratic framework of the country. Problematic areas in relation to the 
location of the institution of traditional leaders are also discussed in this chapter. 
7 
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Chapter four discusses different propositions made in relation to the role that the 
institution of traditional leadership should play and thereby makes recommendations in 
that regard. The study is, in whole, summarised in chapter five wherein a more precise 
:.J..~ ... 
response is given to the question of how should the institution of traditional leadership be 
located within the institutional framework of South Africa's new democracy. 
" I 
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---Chapter 1---
Democracy and the institution of traditional leadership 
, 
~- ''''-
1.1 Introduction 
Much of the debate on the role of the institution of traditional leadership in a democratic 
system is informed by different perceptions about the relationship of the institution of 
traditional leadership itself and the concept of democracy. A lot is often said about this 
relationship, but an agreement does not seem to emerge. The question however remains: 
is the institution of traditional leadership compatible with democracy? This chapter 
attempt to respond to this vexing question. Some brief reflections on the concept of 
democracy will be made with a view to providing the basis for evaluating the institution 
of traditional leadership. 
1.2 The concept democracy 
As Birch (1993: 47) informs us, "the word 'democracy' democracy comes/rom the Greek 
.' 
I 
and literally means rule by the people". However, definitions of the term are 
multifarious. For Frank Michel, democracy implies "selfrule" (Chapman and Shapiro, 
1993: 169). Schweikert (1995: 211) defines democracy as " a system in which a 
universal electorate is active and unobstructed by a privileged minority class". It is 
important to note that democracy can take different forms and manifestations, hence the 
multiplicity of its types, e.g. participatory democracy, deliberative democracy liberal 
9 
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democracy, etc. These verSiOns of the concept notwithstanding, there are certain 
principles that any democratic system cannot eschew, e.g. equality before the law, 
freedom of expression, accountability, etc. it is for this reason that Belmet (1998) 
:..J ''''1_ 
concludes that: 
Whatever meaning democracy carries in a particular constitution, the word 
generally implies that the nation should be allowed to exercise final control 
over its government through elected representatives, with the corollary that 
officers of government are accountable to the people. 
The democraticness of any society, therefore, is dependent on whether or not such society 
does have control over its government. This means that government in a democratic 
society is an instrument of people's rule. It is for this reason that that Birch contends 
that: 
... a democratic society ... is one without hereditary class distinction, in which 
there is something approaching equality of opportunities for all citizens ... not 
a form of government. 
Thus, an evaluation of the extent to which institutions or governments are democratic 
does not ne'~~ssarily need to emphasize the form of such institutions, but the extent to 
which the institutions uphold the values of equality and non-discrimination. This means 
I 
i 
that the institutions must be owned by and serve the people on whom the institutions 
impact. The implication of this, therefore, is that govemment and its institutions have to 
be legitimate. It is iinportant to deal with the issue of legitimacy, at some length, as it is 
one of the crucial principles of democracy. 
10 
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1.3 Legitimacy 
Max Weber was one of the leading authorities on the concept of legitimacy. What earns 
, 
• .jI '" ... 
him this status is the fact that he was among the few scholars who defined the concept 
with greater clarity and some measure of precision. As a result, most scholars wrote in 
response to his conception. Weber identifies three types oflegitimacy: 
1. Traditional Legitimacy - is the legitimacy enjoyed by tribal chiefs, princes and 
kings. In this kind of regime the essential factor that ensures compliance with the 
orders and laws of government is personal loyalty to the chief or king or ruling 
family. 
2. Legal-rational Legitimacy - is that enjoyed the by governments of most 
modem states. In this kind of regime loyalty is given not to a person or a ruling 
family but to an impersonal set of institutions, the powers of which are defined . .. 
by written constitutions ... Public compliance with the orders and laws of 
government is not based on loyalty to persons but on general acceptance of the 
procedures by willch these orders and laws are produced. 
3. Charismatic Legitimacy - depends on the personal qualities of a political 
leader who appears as a kind of hero or saint and inspires ills followers to accept 
ills rule. (Cite in Birch, 1993: 33-4) 
Of all the kinds of legitimacY'delineated above, the key factor is 'fgeneral acceptance". 
,-
Tills implies that no government can rightfully claim to be legitimate without it being 
generally accepted by the people ruled. Therefore, it is necessary that there be a 
.' 
I 
mechanism to determine the general acceptability of government among the people under 
a particular government. Perhaps the question should be: how feasible it is to determine 
the acceptability of governments in the three frameworks conceptualised by Weber? 
Would it make sense for a cillef to claim legitimacy on the basis of the fact that his 
subjects follow a particular tradition? Analyse closely, It does not seem logically 
convincing to argue that a govenunent is legitimate because it is based on the tradition of 
I I 
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its people, as some people may respect their traditions generally while not accepting their 
government - no matter how traditionally rooted such a govemment may be. There could 
be multifarious reasons for this. It could be that people feel that their government is 
.J .", _ 
repressive or unresponsive to their needs. In this case, it would appear that tradition is not 
a proper mechanism for gauging the general acceptability of govemment. 
Charismatic legitimacy does not seem to be unproblematic, as Birch (1993) observes, 
authority may die when the charismatic leader dies. Moreover, it may not be possible to 
- . " . 
ascertain the legitimacy of certain·decisions taken by a popular leader if there are no clear 
guidelines in terms of what the people want. Sometimes a charismatic leader may take 
certain decisions that are not necessarily in line with the interests of the people, thus if 
people do not actively disagree, or if the governance system does not cater for a 
mechanism for registering dissent, it could mistakenly be concluded that the decisions 
taken are legitimate even ifthey are actually not. 
Weber's cop.ception of legitimacy in its modem context seems cogent as it is based on 
general acceptance of institutions that are clearly defined and codified. In this context, the 
I 
will of the .people is written down to serve as a clear framework within which the 
govemment should operate. So, if one wants to assess whether or not the govemment of 
the day or its decisions are legitimate, one would examine the extent to which such a 
government respects the will of the people as written down. Whenever the govemment 
deviates from the interests of the people, it thus becomes easy to determine that the 
government's decisions are not legitimate. The codification of the general will of the 
12 
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people also include the procedure by which a govemment assumes and relinquishes 
power and this reasonably serves to clarify the legitimacy of any govemment. 
-~ '.., -
Scholars are sharply divided over the question of the legitimacy of traditional leaders, 
especially with regard to modem-day societies. Some argue that the institution of 
traditional leadership is legitimate while others argue to the contrary. Peter Rutsch (in 
Myers, 1999), for example, passionately believes that traditional leaders in South Africa 
continue to enjoy support and thus he argues that the existence of the institution of 
traditional leadership should be b:eyond ·question. However, this argument is not without 
its flaws. Its problem is that it is not backed by empirical evidence. It seems to be based 
merely on the fact that traditional leaders in fact do exist in society today. In what 
appears to be some evidence strengthening this argument some scholars refer us to the 
fact that about 40% of South Africa's popUlation still live in areas that are ruled by chiefs 
(Tapscott, 1997; Van Kessel and Oomen 1997). It is this observation that seems to have 
led many to believe that the institution of traditional leadership is legitimate. Sydney 
Mufamadi, minister of provincial and Local govemment, is among those who believe that 
f '> 
in the rural areas of South Africa people "continue to owe allegiance to the institution of 
traditional ifadership" (A Draft Discussion Document Towards a white Paper on 
Traditional Leadership and Institutions, 2000 p.3). 
What appears to be a major flaw of those who take the percentage of people who live in 
areas that are still under chiefs as proof of the legitimacy of these leaders is that they do 
not seem to realise that the people who live in such areas do not necessarily need to leave 
13 
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those areas to demonstrate their lack of support for traditional leaders. Furthermore, if 
one happens to reside in an area that is under a traditional leader without supporting such 
a leader it does not follow that such a resident must actively (or even passively) 
;J ... 
demonstrate such lack of support. Unfortunately, the argument that relies 011 statistical 
information of people who are resident in a place under the jurisdiction of a traditional 
leader appears to include even a person of the nature described above as one the 
supporters of the traditional leader concerned. It would appear that it is this sort of 
approach that leads Oomen (2000: 63) to conclude that the support of traditional leaders 
in South Africa "does not seem to:have"awindled with the dawning of democracy". 
On closer inspection, the issue of legitimacy vis-a.-vis the institution of traditional 
leadership does not appears to be as less complicated as most commentators would think. 
It is for this reason that it is even harder for most politicians to camouflage their 
reservations, no matter how hard they try not to offend traditional leaders. Sometimes 
politicians express their reservations by making insinuations like this: "Of course we all 
understand that this institution does not have an elective base and will not have one" 
~ '>. 
(Thabci Mbeki, 2000). This highlights awareness of the difficulty in arriving at the 
definite con91usion that traditional leaders are legitimate. This difficulty is similarly 
expressed by Myers (1999) as he challenges those who simplistically exhort us to believe 
that culture legitimises traditional leaders. He has the following to say: 
The advocates of traditional authority present us with lengthy explanations 
of the cultural legitimacy of chieftaincy, but can we ever know that it is this 
and nothing else that fills the consciousness of all rural villagers? Can we 
be certain that there is never a moment of doubt, duplicity, or disrespect in 
14 
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the minds of a chief's subjects? ... the proof of cultural legitimacy becomes 
the political scientist's equivalent of the philosopher 's proof of god. 
It is empirically not easy to sustain an argument that by virtue of a traditional leader 
. ~ ""-
being "the custodian of culture", therefore, all who practice the culture see him as 
legitimate. This matter is not as easy as testing the legitimacy of the ANC in South 
African society today; where one could simply look at the number of people who voted 
for the ANC in the latest election and thus conclude convincingly that the ANC enjoys 
the support of about 66 percent of the South African population. Testing the legitimacy 
of traditional leaders becomes ev~n more perplexing considering that: 
The problem around legitimacy includes the fact that some traditional 
leaders who illegitimately came into power for instance by appointment via 
colonial rulers since then have ... created their own "legitimacy" which is 
not based on historic traditions or hereditary practice (Naudascher and 
KgatJanye, 1997). 
As it is known, the legitimacy of traditional leaders is believed to be derived from 
tradition. How then does one use tradition as a barometer in this context considering the 
above realif'y? Maloka(1999) argues that the Bantustan system has eroded the legitimacy 
of chieftaincy in most parts of South Africa. It is not very easy to refute this claim given 
.' 
i 
the somewhat questionable role that traditional leaders have played in South Africa's 
painful past. The fact that the legitimacy of traditional leaders is disputable makes it 
difficult to sustain the argument that the institution of traditional leadership is 
undisputedly democratic. It has been shown earlier that the principle of legitimacy is part 
of the arteries sustaining the heart of any democratic system 
15 
1.4 Customary law 
Like Voster (2001) this study takes customary law to mean " ... the customs and usages 
-t "~ _ 
traditionally observed among the indigenous African peoples of Soulh Africa and which 
form part of the culture of those people". The choice of this definition does not mean that 
the other existing definitions are less important, but the observation is that this particular 
one does attempt to capture the essence of customary law. 
The principle of natural justice,:inter"alia, requires that there must be fairness in the 
manner in which the law applies to all citizens of any polity. Thus equality before the 
law is one way of ensuring fairness. The democratic character of any system of 
governance rests, among other things, on the protection of these norms. It means 
therefore that the law is an important pillar of democracy, which suggests that one can 
tell whether a particular society is democratic or not by looking at the manner in which 
the law is applied. 
~ .. ,. 
In the light of the forgoing background it is therefore necessary to interrogate whether or 
not customa.tY law serves as an instrument of democracy. Like many other aspects of 
traditional leadership, customary law is also a subject of fierce disagreement among 
scholars. This pertains to its capacity to enhance or curtail democracy. However, the 
existence of disagreement does not mean that it is impossible to arrive at a logically 
convincing conclusion on this issue. Actually, the disagreement serves to provide the 
16 
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basis for further interrogation of the issue, as it is out of further engagement that a more 
refined explanation can emerge. 
. ; '''l ... 
Out of the existing literature on customary law, there is notable body of scholars who 
begin the analysis of customary law from the point where traditional leaders were under 
colonial control. Central to this body ofliterature, is the argument that: 
The shape of official customary law is largely the product of the way in 
which it was recognised under apartheid, whose cornerstone was the 
reinforcement of difJerenc.e (Oomen, 2000: 67). 
The point that this literature attempts to drive home is that what is currently said to be 
customary law is in actual fact a product of some redefinition and restructuring done by 
either the colonial state or the defunct apartheid government. The intended purpose of 
this point is to make analysts understand that customary law as it is today reflects 
attempts by these regimes to make traditional leaders accountable to the state instead of 
their people (Mamdani, 1996:63). What follows from tllis explanation is that as it stands, 
•..  . ' 
customary raw is fundamentally distorted. 
I 
Flowing from tl1is is the idea that customary law in its pristine form was not bad in as far 
as the promotion of fairness in society is concerned, but has been corrupted by the 
external forces. One cannot stop asking the question: how true is this claim? This 
question takes us to the other segment of the literature on customary law, which seeks to 
respond to the very question. Unlike the version of literature discussed above, this one 
attempts to give an account of customary law prior to colonialism. Tllis therefore means 
17 
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that we can rely on the infoll11ation provided by this literature as it presents the subject 
dealt with herein the form that is not tempered with by forces of distortion, colonialism 
and apartheid. 
. , 
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It must be mentioned, however, that the body of literature that claims to present an 
untempered version of customary law is, on its own, is divided into two segments. The 
first version actually serves to corroborate the position discussed above, i.e. customary 
law in its pristine form was a good instnunent to regulate social relations based on the 
principle of natural justice. HamInond:Yooke's (1993:71) account hereunder represents 
this version: 
There existed among all his subjects a clear perception of fairness and 
justice, a concept of how a 'reasonable' chief should behave - and a chief 
exceeded these bounds at his peril. The ultimate sanction was rebellion, or 
the moving away of a section of the population under one of his brothers. . .. 
political arrangements included a series of checks and balances to limit 
chiefly tyranny and to provide for wider participation in the decision-
making process. 
,. 
It is further asserted that, "The procedure followed by the courts is customary procedure, 
which is generally regarded as simple, informal and flexible" (Independent Projects , 
i 
Trust, 2002: 116). This version of the literature paints a picture that "customary law 
proper" (proper is conveniently used by the researcher to merely distinguish between the 
tainted version of the law and the pristine one) was/is good and fair with well-known 
boundaries that guide the actions of traditional leaders. Looked at from this angle, it 
would be difficult to find any thing that renders customary incongruent with democracy 
as checks and balances and fairness are basically among the principles that strengthen 
18 
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democracy. What gives more credit to customary law here is the claim that customary 
law created an environment that allowed for broader societal participation. The said 
simplicity and flexibility of customary procedure is another factor counting in favour of 
-011 ' .. 
customary law as described by the version of literature under discussion. There is nothing 
in any form of democracy that justifies the prohibition of simple and flexible procedures 
in society. Actually, a democratic system becomes even enhanced when most, if not all, 
participants in such a system can easily understand its procedures. 
However, the problem with this version' of literature is that there are flaws .and loopholes 
in the data presented as evidence. It is these loopholes that make is even difficult to take 
the thrust of what is presented as credible. Consider, for example, the very account given 
by Homrnond-Tooke above, he writes that the instrument that people could use to punish 
a traditional leader who disregarded the law was rebellion or the moving away of a 
particular section of the disgruntled society. This is squarely antithetical to democracy. It 
actually nullifies Hammond-Tooke's very argument that customary law proper provides 
for checks and balances. In a system where there are checks and balances, a leader cannot 
!'" 
have .aroom to disregard the law. Ifa leader does so, the law in such a democratic system 
ultimately PJevails - meaning that no section of such a society would have to breake 
away as such a leader would be brought before the law. If it means that when a leader has 
transgressed the law it is the people who should run away from their land, it therefore 
becomes clear that there is no democracy in such society, but rather absolute dictatorship. 
As Bobbio points out, democratic forms of government require that the laws be made by 
the people to whom they apply (Post in Chapman and Shapiro, 1993: 169-170). So the 
19 
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scenario portrayed by the scholars who argue that customary law proper is fair and good 
does not seem to meet this criterion as it is said that customary provides that if you are 
not amenable to the traditional leader's , vagaries you simply have to leave his territory. In 
..... ., -
this sense, it would appear that under customary law the people have no final say over 
their lives, but it is the traditional leader who does. Furthermore, the land is reduced to a 
mere property of the traditional leader, as the citizens have no rights over the land on 
which they reside. Thus the only way through which they can maintain their stay on the 
land is by keeping in tune with the their leader even when the leader rides roughshod over 
- , . 
. their interests. The implication of customary law in this case is that it legitimises the 
dictatorship of the traditional leader. 
The loopholes that are found in the evidence adduced by the first version of the scholars 
who attempt to give an account of customary law in its pristine form, as discussed above, 
seems to corroborate the second version of the literature. What earns this version of the 
literature some distinctiveness is the denial of the notion that customary law proper is fair 
and good. Here we are persuaded to believe that customary law is basically used in most 
cases to further the interests of traditional leaders and that the concept of checks and 
} 
balances is foreign to customary law. The following passage aptly represents the scholars 
ofthis ilk: 
True, the poor man found an easy access to the courts; but if he chanced to 
be in conflict with a friend of the favourite 'of the court', the die was always 
heavily loaded against him ... (Bryant, 1949: 462) 
20 
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It is W011h noting that traditional leaders serve both as the executive and the judiciary at 
the same time in as far as customary law is concerned. So when Bryant says 'the court' 
he refers to a customary court headed by a traditional leader. It would appear from the 
~ .. '''-\ 
evidence that customary courts are prone to biasness in cases where the interests of 
traditional leaders are at stake. The system makes it improbable for a poor fellow to make 
it if he happens to be up against anyone attached to the royalty. What this means is that 
the system creates conditions for people to make underhand connections with the royalty 
so as to ensure that the law is always on their side. Where is the principle of natural 
justice here? Where is the principle of' equality before the law? Clearly, principles like 
these can never exist in a system where the law treats some people with speciality. This 
kind of a situation is not only incongruent with a democratic system, but contributes to a 
negative perception about customary law itself among the people it is supposed to serve. 
This is evident is in a recent ' study done by Oomen (2000) where most respondents 
indicated their resentfulness of customary courts for their unfainess . Mzala (\988) 
underscores the major flaws of the customary legal· system when he argues that, "even in 
cases where chiefs were themselves a party to the dispute of charge, they could still 
~'> 
preside asjudges in matters where they had an interest". It would appear that this kind of 
a system is l}ot unproblematic. 
As demonstrated above, there are conflicting accounts of customary vis-a-vis democracy. 
On the one hand, there are those scholars who argue that customary law proper is 
fundamentally in line with good governance while at the same time there are those who 
dispute this view. However, a closer analysis reveals that the evidence adduced by those 
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who contend that customary law does comply with principles of faimess does not seem to 
be wateliight. It would appear reasonable, therefore, to conclude that although there are a 
few positive things that can be said about customary law proper, such as its accessibility, 
:-J . .." _ 
generally it is not a good instrument to advance democracy as it has serious loopholes 
that make it easy for traditional leaders to abuse it. 
1.5 Traditional leadership and gender 
D~mocracy does not promote the discrImination of people on the basis of sex. Male or 
female people are considered equal regarding their participation in the politics of society. 
TIllS includes, among other things, taking part in the leadership of society. Any system of 
governance that is said to be democratic can be tested, inter aliar, on the extent to which 
it excludes or includes woman. When subjected to this criterion, the institution of 
traditional leadership does not seem to score any point as it is reputed for being a terrain 
of males, except in a few cases where some nations accommodated women in the 
leadership 1(ructure (Hammond-Tooke, 1993:75). 
However, t):{e issue of gender vis-a-vis traditional leadership needs to be understood 
within the broader context of African culture where women have been/are still 
systematically subjected to different forms of discrimination in the activities of society. 
In most communities women are given a lower status as compared to their male 
counterparts and thus are excluded from certain social processes, roles and 
responsibilities. For example, Mamdani (1996: 64) points out that women in most 
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African cultures can "neither inherit 1101' bequeath". This patriarchal cultural principle 
has far reaching implications in relation to women and leadership. It means that women 
-
are completely excluded from the system of leadership as they cannot inherit nor 
-; . .., ... 
bequeath leadership. The following words are important to amplify this point: 
If a daughter takes ubukhosi, it will create problems when she goes out to 
get married to another family. It won't be acceptable .. . for her to inherit 
ubukhosi and then take it with her to anoiher house. Ubukhosi is given to the 
first-born sun of the chosen house and remains in that line. Everybody 
knows and accepts it ... So in the foreseeable future I don't see that 
changing (a chief cited in !PT, 2~OO: 134) 
As the colonial government passed legislation to control traditional leadership it also 
codified "The minority status of AtTIcan rural women in the Native Administration Act 
of 1927(Van Kessel and Oomen, 1997: 574). This served to legally concretise the 
exclusion of women from important issues of society including leadership by law. 
However, it is necessary to point out that it is not objective to argue that the colonial 
government must shoulder the entire blame here as it basically codified something that 
had been up?~e1d by most African cultures. Although some strides are being made to raise 
the status of women, there are still very few female chiefs in South AtTIca today and the 
institution of traditional leadership still continues to be rigid in terms of allowing women 
to be leaders as well. This is neither the result of colonialism nor apartheid, but a direct 
consequence of cultural conservatism on the part of most male traditional leaders. For 
example, chiefs reject the inclusion of women saying that: 
... We are in Africa and we remain in Africa. We are not prepared to give up 
and sacrifice our Aji'icanism, ... the whole impact of equality was having an 
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impact on the lobola {bridewealth} custom ... Who must lobola whom. if we 
are all equal? (cited in Maloka, 1996) 
This shows how deeply rooted and complicated the issue of women vis-a-vis traditional 
leadership is. Considering this, it would appear that bringing the institution of traditional 
leadership into line with democracy - especially as it concerns gender issues will not be 
an easy exercise. The exclusion of women in this regard is rooted in the culture of society 
and tbus given further expression in the leadership structure. 
1.6 Some further reflection on traditionalleadership and democracy 
Broadly speaking, tbe question of the compatibility of the institution of traditional 
leadership with democracy is a subject of contestation. Some scholars argue that the 
institution of traditional is not inimical to democracy while there are also those who 
contend that it is. Claude Alee (2001: 34), for instance, argues that traditional African 
political systems in their pristine form were infused with democratic values. This, 
according t9 Ake, was tbe central feature of African political systems regardless of the 
difference in their manifestation. Ayittey (1991) further articulates this view by 
contending t)lat, "Authority from the people was needed to rule". The problem with this 
line of argument is that is too general. It appears to be lacking in detail and it 
oversimplifies matters. ,This oversimplification is problematic, in tbat it eclipses the 
significance of institutional manifestation in determining the extent to which a particular 
system is democratic or not. 
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It is worth stressing that issues related to institutional manifestation are crucial in 
analysing the democraticness of institutions. If evidence were to be adduced 
-
strengthening the claim that the institution of traditional leadership is democratic, such 
... '''!-
evidence would need to be rigorous in its proof that the institutions of traditional 
leadership are democracy-friendly. Inevitably, this would need to also address itself to 
issues of power relations between leaders and their subjects as well as the issue of 
authority in the system - identifying the loci of power - whether it resides with traditional 
leaders or the people. It is interesting to observe how following passage attempts to shed 
some light on these critical issues: 
On closer examination we will discover that those public figures designated 
by modern scholars as chiefs and kings were not politicians strictu senso 
and the institutions they embodied were not political institutions, and even 
less political systems. Certainly, we can speak of centralised decision-
making, but decisions of leaders were subject to various rules and 
limitations imposed by the populations which they were supposed to lead. 
(Scalnik, 1996:111). 
This sounds like a response to the criticism levelled at the institution of traditional 
leadership lhat it does not meet democratic standards. What this kind of response 
manages to do is to attempt to make a distinction between politics in the modem sense of 
t 
;' 
the word and traditional leadership. But the attempt cannot provide any justification that 
the institution of traditional leadership should be absolved for not being democratic. 
Actually, that is not the issue. The issue is whether or not the institution is democratic. 
On this specific question Scalnik also falls into the same trap that other scholars find 
themselves in, that is, going too general and say that under traditional leadership the 
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subjects do impose some limitations on their leaders. The how part of it seems to be left 
unattended to. 
-J . ., _ 
The lack of clarity on issues of institutional manifestation makes it hard to refute the 
argument that the institution of traditional leadership is generally not democratic. For 
example, Kuper(1986: 33) observes that nepotism is a rampant phenomenon in the 
leadership of the Swazi people and that ''power radiates from the king to other members 
of the royal lineage". Actually, this is no peculiarity of the Swazi people, it is something 
that many scholars talk about as being prevalent in most African communities that 
observe the system of traditional leadership. Power resides only in the royal family. 
Clearly, this is not in line with democratic tenets were every member in society can stand 
for election to be a leader of such society. As Bennett (1998) observes, election is not a 
criterion for assuming office under a traditional system of leadership. It is heredity that 
determines this and it is only restricted to the royal family. If the lottery of birth has 
thrown one outside the royal family, it means that such a person can never be a leader for 
life. The question is: is this kind of system reconcilable with democracy? 
f "' 
It would se'1in that a society that cherishes democratic values would find it very hard to 
accept the hereditary system of governance as appears to exclude other people form 
leadership while reserving a special place for others. Inherent in a traditional system is 
the assumption that people are not equal and as such some are not fit to hold positions of 
leadership. The "lottery of birth" principle does not seem to take into consideration issues 
related to the capacity and potential for some individuals to rule. It is either you are in or 
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out of the "fortunate family". This IS fundamentally m conflict with democracy -
whatever form it may take. 
~ ''''1-
The system of traditional leadership also emphasises personality instead of institutions. 
This is due to the fact that in a traditional system leaders are born. Thus it is known 
before hand as to who will be the successor of a particular leader. As a result, the 
prospective successor is groomed so that he develops certain personal qualities (Mason, 
1956: 139). It is neither bad nor anti-democracy for a leader to have good personal 
qualities, but the problem with the system of traditional leadership is that it is highly 
centred on personality than on institutional strength. This subjects the whole popUlation 
to the mercy of a leader than institutions and thus reducing the certainty of their lives. 
The corollary of this is that if a particular leader is personally despotic, society is in 
danger like in the case of king Shaka Zulu (Bryant, 1949). On the contrary, democratic 
systems have institutional mechanisms to curb the abuse pf power by leaders and thus 
empowering the electorate. 
1. 7 Conclusion 
l 
f 
Tllis chapter sought to discuss the concept of democracy in relation the institution of 
traditional leaders. Out of the discussion, it is clear that although democracy can be 
defined differently, there are certain values that are central to all democratic systems such 
as the rule of law, equality, accountability, etc. It is this that makes it possible for any 
system of governance to be evaluated so as to detennine whether it is compatible with 
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democracy or not. Subjected to this test, the institution oftraditionalleadership appears to 
be lacking in many respects. 
.J " 
The legitimacy of traditional IS derived from traditions. These traditions have been 
tempered with in many ways by the colonial and apartheid regimes, such that, it is no 
longer easy to tell ifthey are really in place. 
The fact women are culturally accorded a low status in most African societies has some 
adverse implications for women :vis-a-'vis traditional leadership. Although there are few 
communities that accommodate women in their leadership structures, most traditional 
systems of govemance completely exclude women from issues of leadership, thus 
rendering the institution of traditional leadership an exclusive domain of men, This 
therefore, discards the principle of equality from the system, which does not augur well 
with democracy. 
On the whole, the institution of traditional leadership appears to be incompatible with 
~ "'" 
democracy as it is based on a system that is centred on personality and hereditary 
procedure 0tascendancy to power. 
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The South African institution of traditional leadership in historical 
confext 
.... ".'-
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the evolution of the institution of traditional leadership. The 
investigation will star from the pre-colonial period to the apartheid era. The pre-colonial 
era will be looked at within the broader context of the African continent, as the South 
African society is not necessarily unique in its pre-colonial form. This approach will also 
be employed in the discussion of colonialism, as the country is one of the many African 
countries to which the British policy of indirect rule was applied. Given the significance 
of the African National Congress (ANC) in past and present politics of South Africa, the 
chapter will also reflect on the historical relations of the organisation and the institution 
of traditional leaders. As it will be demonstrated in the chapter, these relations have a 
bearing on the current state of affairs in relation to the position of traditional leaders. 
J 
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2.2 The pre-colonial era 
Every society has its past. History helps societies not only in making them aware of their 
past, but it is also crucial in aiding new generations deal with current challenges. In the 
same vein, the colonial era's importance does not lie only in the fact that it enables South 
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Africans to know their ongms, but also presents some important lessons for the 
understanding of the evolution of the institution oftraditionalleadership. 
:.J ."l _ 
Historical data reveal that in pre-colonial Afiica there were over 10 000 little "states, 
kingdoms, ethnic unions and federations" (John Matshikiza, Mail & Guardian, 17 to 23 
May 2002). These polities were fragmented and largely based on kinship lineages. 
Hamond-Tooke (1962: 166) reflects the nature of these polities in the context of the 
Bhaca society: 
. . . society is organised on the criteria of kinship and territorial distribution 
into structural units. Homesteads, neighbourhood units, lineages, all 
possess considerable solidarity and form distinct social groupings, 
conscious of their own unity and opposing disruption and absorption by 
other groups. The whole society is segmented on this basis. 
Some scholars use the term "acephalous" while others utilise the concept of "headless" 
to define and describe this type of social organisation that characterised the African 
continent prior to the advent of colonialism (Skalnik, 1996). The use of this terminology 
~ .. .. 
is .an attempt by present-day scholars to shed light on the difference between the pre-
colonial A,frican polity and the modem state. The pre-colonial African polity is presented 
I 
in contrast to the current manifestation of the state - where the state is much larger, 
thereby transcending kin-based identities with the head of state in the form of the 
president, the prime minister, etc. What is interesting to observe is the influence that the 
modem state has in the analysis of pre-colonial African politics. So conspicuous in the 
analysis is the fact that the modem state is used as the barometer on the basis of which 
the stateness or statelessness of the pre-colonial African polity is analysed. Bennett 
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(1998) argues that, "". the typical African polity was poised halfway between being a 
state and centrifugal state". It is clear here that this definition does not presents the pre-
colonial African polity as a state in the modern sense of the word. However, there are 
other scholars who argue that pre-colonial African polities were veritable states. 
Hammond- Tooke (1993), for example, contends that these polities were states as they 
had institutionalised political authority. All these conceptual differences notwithstanding, 
what is clear is that a pre-colonial African polity was in many ways distinct from a 
modem state. This difference, for example, expresses itself in the size of the polity, the 
- ~ . . 
basis of the unity of its population, etc. perhaps this point could be articulated with more 
clarity ifthe issue of leadership is considered. 
The pre-colonial African polity was led by what we today refer to as traditional leaders, 
kings or chiefs. The question is: who is a traditional leader? Weber (cited in 
d'Engelbronner-Kolff, Hintz and Sindano, 1998: 4) argues that traditional leadership 
refers to the authority that is based on the belief in' 'sacred traditions in force since time 
immemoria~~. and the legitimacy of those who are called to govern by said traditions. As it 
can be' seen, this definition also evokes issues related to legitimacy. These issues have 
been dealt with in the preceding chapter but, for now, attention should be focussed on the 
fact that this definition presents the concept of 'tradition' as the basis of leadership. 
Tradition includes a " ... whole range of inherited culture and way of life; a people's 
history, moral and social values and the traditional institutions which survive to serve 
those values" (Oomen, 2000: 12). It can be said, therefore, that traditional leaders are 
leaders who mle and govern their societies on the basis of traditional practices and values 
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of their respective societies. These are the leaders who governed pre-colonial African 
polities. In agreeing, Mofamadi has the following to say: 
-J .... 
Prior to the introduction of colon-ialism, social organisation in South Africa 
was characterised by a number of tribal regimes based on patriarchy and 
ascriptive norms. Each tribe ... had a traditional leader who was the central 
feature (Department of Provincial and Local Government, 2000). 
What is important to note from the above citation is the mention of the traditional leader 
as the highest authority over a tribe. This therefore makes it clearer that there was no 
other authority above traditional1eaders during the era under discussion. Cementing this 
view, in the context of the Zulu people, Bryant (1949) argues that the King was the 
'captain of the ship '. This expression describes the position of traditional leaders, then, 
with a higher degree of clarity - that they were the authority at the highest level of their 
polities. This led Nannan (1998) to conclude that traditional leaders were "leaders, not 
appendages, to bureaucratic systems". 
These leade~s penneated almost all spheres of their subjects' life - from political to 
~ ,. 
economic, and from religious to cultural. Table 1.1 bellow shows the kind of 
responsibilitjes these leaders had. 
Table 1.1: Powers and Functions of traditional leaders prior to colonialism. 
Powers of traditional leaders before colonial rule 
Political Functions • Sovereignty: Safety and security, protection 
• Relations to "outsiders" 
Economic Functions • Land allocation and distribution/Custodians of land 
• Facilitator of and economic and environmental matters 
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and development 
• Facilitator of infrastmcture and services 
• Tax collecting powers 
Social Functions • Courts decisions and implementation 
• JUd(cial administration, law-abiding societies 
• Healih-systems, traditional healers 
Cultural Fun ctions • Sacred and spiritual leadership 
• Custom and tradition, cultural matters 
SOURCE: Naudacher K. and Kgadhanye N. (1997) Report of the Regional Conference on traditional 
Leadership. South Africa: Fliedrich Ebert Stiftung. 
As it can be seen from the table above, traditional leaders performed a wide variety of 
flllctions and had all-round powers vis-a-vis their societies in pre-colonial Africa. It is for 
this reason that traditional leaders are viewed as having been responsible for the well-
being of their communities. There is hardly an aspect in the life of their subjects over 
which they did not have authority. This what has led what has led many scholars to liken 
the relationship between traditional leaders and their subjects to that of father-to-children 
relationship. This shows that a traditional leader, then, occupied the highest office in his 
community as a father does in a typical African family. This is clear in Hammond-
Tooke's (1%2) observation: 
.' 
I The chief is not merely the most important and most powerful member of the 
tribe, he is the tribe, the embodiment of all the attitudes, emotions and 
values that ensure its solidarity. He is the symbol of tribal unity. 
This reinforces the point made earlier that traditional leaders permeated almost all aspects 
of their subjects' life. The question is: what was the procedure for ascendancy to a 
position of leadership? As pointed out earlier, traditional leaders mled by tradition in pre-
colonial Africa. Tradition also applies to ascendancy to a position of leadership. It is 
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tradition that detennined this process. Ascendancy to leadership was a function of 
heredity. The main principles here are ''primogeniture'' and "agnation" (Hammond-
Tooke, 1962). These are the principles that that guided communities in as far as the issues 
...J. 0"l_ 
of ascendancy to leadership is concerned. 
2.3 Colonialism and traditional leadership. 
The process of colonising the African continent had far-reaching implications for the 
lives of the African peoples and their i~adership. This process was uneven in the way it 
impacted on African countries. In their colonies, for example, the French pursued a 
policy of assimilation while the British, as it will be demonstrated below, pursued a 
different one. South Africa is one of the many countries that fell under the colonial grip 
of Britain. Like other coloniser-countries, Britain found most African societies living 
under the leadership of traditional leaders. Obviously, the task of colonising required that 
the intruders take over the leadership in the land of the colonised. This challenge could 
not be tackled without having to deal with traditional leaders as the people who led 
African societies prior to the arrival of the colonialists. For the colonisers, the question 
was: how bdt to assume leadership of the indigenous people of Africa? What do we do 
with their leaders, traditional leaders? 
In response to this question, the British then engineered a policy of indirect rule. This 
policy meant that the British would take over the leadership of the colonies without 
getting rid of traditional leaders. The strategy was to find a way of dominating the lives 
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of the African native people with minimal revolt from them. This would be achieved by 
ensuring that traditional leaders are also part of the broader colonial leadership stmcture. 
The realisation by the British was that if traditional leaders were completely done away 
~J _" _ 
with it would not be easy to secure the support of the African masses for the colonial 
system to be stable and sustainable. Nwomonoh (1994) captures the philosophy behind 
indirect rule: 
The underlying belief behind indirect rule was that every system of 
government, if it is to be permanent and progressive, must have its roots in 
. . ' -
the framework of indigenous society. 
Clearly, the British forces realised that they could not successfully govern the indigenous 
African people without the use of traditional leaders, as they were foreign to the native 
people. It is understandable therefore, that the British saw traditional leaders as a critical 
link between them (the British) and the indigenous people, or as an instrument of 
legitimisation. It is against this backdrop that Temple (cited in Nwomonoh, 1994) argues 
that: 
If European governments destroy, directly or indirectly, the powers of 
traditional rulers, they will have wiped out the only voluntary basis upon 
which Africa can be administered. 
This argument exposes the intensions and the attitudes of the colonialists towards the 
institution of traditional leadership. The institution was viewed as a strategic vehicle for 
the Europeans to take themselves into a position where Africans could accept them. This 
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then makes it clear as to how traditional leaders are linked to the whole colonial edifice of 
domination. 
. , 
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In South Africa, the British policy of indirect rule was fust introduced in Natal as early as 
the mid-ninetieth century. Sir Theophilus Shepstone is one of the first colonialists in 
South Africa who worked arduously to impose indirect rule on the Zulus of Natal 
(Zungu, 1997). But, as Mamdani (1996) points out, the application of the policy was, at 
this stage, basically a "trial and error" exercise. It came into full and perfect force with 
the passage of the Native administratio~ Act No. 38 of 1927, some seventeen years after 
the fonnation of the Union government. This Act gave the Governor-General the powers 
to appoint and destool traditional leaders as he deemed it necessary and thus making him 
the supreme traditional leader of the land. It would appear that the British were fully 
aware that, although they needed to maintain the institution of traditional leadership, they 
desperately had to have effective control over it. It was not unclear to them that the 
institution would not serve as a good colonial instrument outside the grip of colonial rule. 
It is for thi~ .reason that the Act gave the Governor-General such unlimited powers over 
the institution oftraditionalleadership . 
.' 
( 
The question that remains to be answered is: what implications did the Act have for the 
institution of traditional leaders? The fact that the Governor-General was given powers 
to appoint and depose traditional leaders at will, clearly shows that traditional leaders 
were now compelled to be accountable to the colonial government. It meant that these 
traditional leaders had to act in a manner that gratified the Governor-General as a 
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representative of the colonial establislunent. The ultimate aIm was to systematically 
convert the institution of traditional leadership into an extension of the colonial 
government in black communities (Mzala, 1988: 42). Traditional leaders were now 
-4 '" _ 
expected to act as eyes and ears of the central colonial government. What this means is 
that a gulf was now being created between traditional leaders and their people by making 
them account to the colonial government instead of their people. 
The incorporation of traditional leaders into the system of colonial governance saw most 
traditional leaders swimming in a pond of frustration. They were conscious of the fact 
that they had an obligation to serve their people but, at the SaIl1e time, the colonial 
government required them to minister to its interests. HaIl1mond-Tooke (1962) aptly 
captures this dilemma: 
In many ways the headman is in a difficult position. On the one hand he is 
linked by ties of kinship and political office to the people of his location and 
is expected to loolc after their interests and well-being. On the other hand he 
is a paid official of the White administration, under the immediate control of 
the pommissioner and subject to disciplinary action if he fails to obey the 
. latter's lawful instruction. 
, 
As it can be/seen, traditional leaders had tough choices to make under colonialism. Those 
who chose the side of the people were deposed and those who chose to dance to the tune 
of the colonial govenunent saw the light of day. This had far-reaching implications for 
the integrity of the institution, in that the persons who were appointed to replace non-
compliant traditional leaders were not necessarily appointed on the basis of tradition, but 
on the indication of readiness to co-operate with the colonial government. Inevitably, 
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this forced those traditional leaders who complied with the system to cross swords with 
their own people as the aspirations of their people were not always in accord with the 
objectives of the 'foreign infidels' . This system created a room for some traditional 
:.J"I _ 
leaders to abuse power and fertilised the ground for comlption to thrive, as that would not 
threaten their positions as long as it did not fall out of tune with the colonial government 
(Ayittey, 1991). It can be said, therefore, that the advent of colonialism did not only have 
adverse implications for the integrity of the institution of traditional leadership, but also 
victimised the African people. 
It is important to further demonstrate how the advent of colonialism served to bifurcate 
the administration of the colonised societies. The Europeans viewed the way of life of the 
Africans as barbarian. This means that Europeans did not retain the institution of 
traditional leadership because they believed that it was good, but because it would be 
instrumental in furthering their interests. They thus had their own leadership and 
administrative arrangements in their own exclusive ,areas while Africans had theirs on the 
other side of the racial divide, This gave birth to two systems of administration and 
! 
leadership within one country - a system that Mamdani(1996) calls the' bifurcation of the 
state. Furtherinore, it served to legitimise, entrench and concretise racism. , 
On the whole, colonialism represents the first dent to the integrity of the institution of 
traditional leadership, in that this was the first time that some higher authority was 
imposed above traditional leaders in the leadership of African polities - an authority that 
corrupted and radically changed the institution of traditional leadership. 
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2.4 Apartheid: deepening the instrumentalisation of traditional leaders 
..... '..,-
The year 1948 represents a major turning point in the history of South Africa. It is the 
year in which the National Party (NP) finally managed to fully gain control of the state. 
The accession of the NP brought about a new philosophy of socia-political relations in 
the country - an ideology of apartheid. This ideology was engineered to give rise to a 
society of deepened racial disintegration in South Africa. It was based on the cherishment 
of racial differentiation by the: Afrikaner government. Hill captures the theoretical 
premise of apartheid thus: 
The theory goes on that the Republic's Africans compose not one but many 
national groups. Ethnic divisions, it is said, are so fundamental and deeply 
felt that they could not possibly be overcome to allow all groups to combine 
in a single political entity ... (Hill, 1964: 1). 
So it was presented as a matter of necessity for black people to be separated along ethnic 
lines. Actu,.ally, apartheid, as Hill (1964: 1) observes, was a "system of social 
differentiation and deprivation of political rights for almost all non-whites". Thus 
apartheid w,ls in fact based on a staunch belief in white supremacy. However, the 
government had to coach this programme of white supremacy in a language that sounded 
palatable and innocuous to the black people. It was therefore portrayed as a programme 
meant to promote separate development (Quinlan, 1986). The question is: how did the 
then governnlent give practical expression to apartheid and how did that affect the 
institution of traditional leadership? 
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The practical institutionalisation of apartheid came with the passage of the Black 
Authorities Act No. 68 of 1951. This Act provided for the balkanisation of South Africa 
into a system of Bantustans meant to compartmentalise Africans along the lines of 
ethnicity. As Bekker (1993) points out, in creating this system the National Party was 
obsessed with chiefs and tribes. The government saw chiefs as the leaders of these newly 
created tribal entities. It is important to mention that this was a threefold strategy on the 
part of the National Party - viz. social, political and economic. 
On the social front, the strategy was to create institutional barriers that would prevent 
interaction between African people from different etlmic groups and between white and 
black people. TIllS would then ensure that the better social status of white people remains 
untempered with by nonwhites. The achievement of this goal would then facilitate the 
attainment of the National Party's political objective - preventing the unity of the Afiican 
people, which was viewed as dangerous (swart gevaar) to the political interests of the 
Afrikaner !cornmunity. On the economic front, the Bantustans were seen as a strategic 
reservoir for cheap labour (Van Kessel and Oomen, 1997). The question is: where does 
} 
this boarder apartheid strategy leave traditional leaders? 
The apartheid government realised that the chiefs were better-placed to be used as leaders 
in the homelands to facilitate the achievement of its goals. It is for that reason that the 
Black Authorities Act provided for the homeland governments to be led mainly by chiefs 
with a few elected members. The dominance of traditional leaders was tactically 
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orchestrated for the apartheid government to be able to control the Bantustans. As 
Mamdani (1996:72) points out, the apartheid government did not basically change or 
-
abandon indirect rule vis-a.-vis traditional leaders, but rather intensified their 
:.J ."" _ 
instrumentalisation. 
Under the Act, traditional leaders still were to be appointed by the central government 
through the department of Native Affairs. This reflects a tactical continuity from the 
colonial era where the Director-General appointed chiefs. The apartheid government still 
needed this to be used as a lever through which traditional authorities could be controlled. 
Essentially, traditional leaders were still representatives of the government. Referring to 
the provisions of the Act, Unterhalter (1990) argues that, "Those regulations require a 
chief to act as an all-round public servant, subject always to the power of the government 
to whom he owes his office". Just like the colonial era, traditional leaders who dared to 
oppose apartheid were deposed. In the Transkei for example, about 30 chiefs were 
destooled in the period between 1955 and 1958 for refusing to dance to the tune of the 
apartheid government (Maloka, 1996). This created a situation where many chiefs co-
~ ,. 
operated with the apartheid government. When the homeland legislatures were formed, 
chiefs consep'ted to the apartheid government's idea that elected representatives must be 
in the minority in all the homeland legislatures. Table 1.2 below reflects the number of 
seats occupied by both elected representatives and traditional leaders in the homeland 
legislatures: 
Table 1.2: Seats occupied by traditional leaders and elected representative in homeland legislatures. 
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Homeland Traditional Elected members Total 
1. Transkei 65 45 110 
2. Bophutatswana 48 
-
24 72 
3. Ciskei 35 20 55 
4. Lebowa 60 ~J '" _ 40 100 
5. Venda 42 18 60 
6. Gazankulu 42 26 68 
7. Qwaqwa 40 20 60 
8. Kwazulu 81 55 136 
9. Swazi - - -
Source: Breytenbanc, W.J. (1975) "Chieftainship and political development in the homelands" in 
Bulletin of Africa Institute of South Africa, No 9 & 10 (eds) p.330. 
The apartheid intellectuals argued that the homeland system was a good way of 
syncretising traditional mode of leadership and modem democracy as it combined both 
elected representatives and traditional leaders. Professor Julius J eppe (cited in 
Breytenbanc, 1975), for example, praised this kind of an arrangement as a unique fo= of 
government that synthesized Western representative democracy and indigenous 
hereditary leadership in one body and as such, he argued that, it was a model of great 
possibilities 
Analysed critically, the argument of apartheid architects was misleading as in reality the 
, 
homeland legislatures and governments were tailored to give traditional leaders more 
influence so that they could serve the apartheid system. Maloka (1996) captures the 
reality of the homeland system when he says: 
... the position of ... chiefs ... was strengthened vis-a-vis that of 
commoners, as the former gradually came to rely all their alliance with the 
.. . government, rather than popular support, to remain in power. 
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This alliance served to deepen the instrnmentalisation of traditional leaders by the 
apartheid government. They were used, as pointed out earlier, as the mral policemen of 
the government, having to ensure among that, inter alia, there was stability in the 
:J ' .. _ 
homelands by guarding against any form of anti-government political activities; ensuring 
the effective implementation of a welter of influx control measures designed by the 
apartheid government, etc (Myers, 1999). 
Clearly, tlus role that the apartheid government designed for traditional leaders inevitably 
had to lead to a serious dent on tlie integrity of the institution of traditional leadership, in 
that traditional leaders were expected to implement very unpopUlar policies of the 
apartheid government. Adding to this unpopUlarity this system fostered rampant 
corruption by traditional leaders: 
Bantustans 'citizens ' were forced to carry membership cards of ruling 
parties in order to get access to government goods and services, especially 
houses and employment in the civil service. For their part, chiefs charged 
fees for access to village resources, especially land. ... this corruption 
varilld from one Bantustan to another. In Sekhukhune, for example, from the 
1960s ... chiefs expected their subjects to raise money to buy them cars, to 
build them houses ... (Maloka, 1996) 
l 
I 
Conscious of the fact that they were protected by the apartheid government, traditional 
leaders felt that committing atrocities of this magnitude against the their people was not a 
problem as long as that was not against the interests of the government. So, what we see 
here is the widening of the gulf whose development was initiated by the colonial 
government through the Native Authorities Act. Under apaIiheid, traditional leaders 
strengthened their ties with the govemment through the homeland system and thereby 
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weakening the nexus between them and their people. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
traditional leaders progressively became one of the targets of anti-apartheid protests in 
black communities, as they were increasingly seen as a cog in the huge wheel of 
~J '.., _ 
apartheid. 
2.5 The African National Congress and the institution of traditional 
leadership. 
The formation of the Union oCSoutfi ' Africa in 1910 served to centralise racism by 
creating a unitary system of governance and to deepen the exclusion of black people from 
taking part in the politics of the country. The union was not fO)lnded on the principle of 
universal franchise, but rather on a political framework that only sought to safeguard the 
participation of white people in the political system. These exclusionary tactics of white 
people inevitably gave rise to new ways and forms of organisation on the part of black 
South Africans. The formation of the ANC in 1912 thus represents a strategic 
reorganisation of black protest against the discriminatory strategies of the colonialists - at 
~ 
this stage, in the form of the newly formed union government. 
J 
i 
The ANC showed a high level of respect for traditional leaders at this early stage of its 
life. Its first constitution adopted in 1919 provided for a structure within the organisation 
for traditional leaders called the Upper House of chiefs (Mzala, 1988: 39). That the ANC 
adopted this attitude towards traditional leaders does not come as a surprise as traditional 
leaders were the only legitimate leaders in African communities. The black people could 
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not be effectively mobilised without wooing traditional leaders. As Maloka (1996: 179) 
points out, traditional leaders were assumed by the ANC as representing their tribes. This, 
therefore, means that the ANC was aware that it could gain access to these tribes through 
:; .. ~ ... 
traditional leaders. 
Traditional leaders were not only important to the ANC as a gateway to the African 
tribes, but they were also vital as a source of strategic financial assistance to the 
organisation. For example, each chief, then, contributed L5 (L stands for shilling) to his 
province while a paramount chief contributed L25 provincially and L25 to the ANC 
headquarters (Maloka, 1996: 179). This therefore means that the organisation had to 
reciprocate the gesture by giving traditional leaders a special place within the 
organisation. 
Over and above, the ANC was fully conscious of the fact that any effective move to 
counter the government's tactics called for a formidable united front of all African people 
across all t¥ibes. Thus, bringing the leaders of these tribes together in one forum was, for 
the ANC, a strategic move to ultimately unite all Africans against one enemy. It can be 
,I 
said, therefore, that the reason why the ANC accorded traditional leaders a respectful 
status in the early years of its existence is because traditional leaders were better placed 
for the advancement of the ANC's agenda, i.e. uniting the indigenous peoples of South 
Africa against the then discriminatory colonial government. 
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The cosy relationship between the ANC and traditional leaders was clearly a thom in the 
neck of the colonial govemment. Understandably, the government could not fold its arms 
-
and watch this relationship flourish. As Mzala (1988) candidly points out: 
:.J. . .., _ 
From the perspective of the South African government, this alliance of the 
people with the chiefs in various ANC campaigns, on such issues as land, 
the franchise, labour, education, civil appointments, passes, liquor, etc., had 
to be confronted and crushed since it radicalised the chiefs. The government 
felt that a way had to be found to 'put the chiefs in their rightful place' - by 
this was meant that they were to become servants of the government. 
It was a matter of political necessity for the government to do everything in its power to 
create a cleavage between traditional leaders and the ANC. The strategy by the 
government to consult with traditional leaders before implementing the Bantu 
Administration Act was thus a calculated move in this direction. The ANC was equally 
aware of these counterrevolutionary tactics of the union government. The attitude of the 
ANC towards the government's consultative approach and the broader attempt to turn 
traditional leaders into government minions is embodied in the words of Walter Sisulu, 
I ~ 
then Secretary-General ofthe organisation: "The Africans will not allow themselves to be 
pushed bacly'into tribalism" (cited in Mzala, 1988: 51). This was a call by the ANC to 
traditional leaders not to pander to the interests of the colonial government by accepting 
the Native Authorities Act. It was not unclear to the ANC that if traditional leaders 
accepted the Act the implications for the unity of the masses of black people would be 
adverse. 
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UnfOltunately, as pointed out in chapter two, most traditional leaders did co-operate with 
the colonial government in the implementation of the Bantu Administration Act. This, 
inevitably, could not go down well with the ANC, as the Act was mainly a political 
~;, '''1 .. 
strategy to weaken the ANC's move to unite Africans across tribal lines. So the period 
around 1927 marks the genesis of what was later to become a major crisis in the 
relationship between traditional leaders and the ANC, 
The partnership that most traditional leaders entered into (in the form of homeland 
governments) with the apartheid goveriiinent, as from 1951, served to add fuel to the fire 
burning the last strings holding the ANC and traditional leaders together. As Hendricks 
and Ntsebeza (1999) observe, traditional leaders were viewed by the ANC during the 
homeland system as being integrally part of the apartheid system. Thus they were 
perceived as being an organ of the enemy. This enmity reigned for the most part of the 
life of the apartheid system. 
Looking at)raditional leaders up to this point, it is clear that theirs has been a life of 
periodically shifting allegiances - from the ANC (in its early years) to the colonial 
government/ and latter to the apartheid system. It is not shocking, therefore, that 
traditional leaders later formed an ostensibly anti-apartheid organisation in 1987, the 
Congress of traditional leaders of South Africa (Contralesa). Although the formation of 
this organisation may also be interpreted as a component of the broader liberation 
struggle as the organisation also undertook to fight aprutheid, it is, to a large extent, a 
function of opportunism on the part of traditional leaders. Contralesa' statement exposes 
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this reality: "apariheid has separated us from our people, now we are going back to them" 
(cited in Maloka, 1996: 180). This statement may partly mean that the gulf between 
traditional leaders and their people is ascribable to the political engineers of apartheid, 
:..J..", _ 
but the statement also carries some important truth that traditional leaders themselves also 
contributed to the development of the gulf by allowing themselves to swim in the pond of 
apartheid masterminds. Viewed from this perspective, the half-truth that Contralesa is an 
antiapariheid agent becomes less veiled. The fact that as from 1987 to 1989s the 
Contralessa's membership had grown from 38 to about 150 (Maloka, 1996: 181) 
indicates that traditional leaders were conscious of the need to position themselves well 
for the future as it was increasingly becoming clear that the ANC was a government in 
waiting. 
What remains puzzling to many observers is the fact that the ANC did not refuse to 
resuscitate its relationship with the former collaborators of apariheid (chiefs). Quite 
bizarrely, the initiatives to establish contralesa were enthusiastically welcomed by the 
ANe. This~Japprochement attitude was very much to the chagrin of many young ANC 
members who had been up in arms against traditional leaders in many black 
.. ) 
commumtle,S. 
The position by the leadership of the ANC to realign the organisation with traditional 
leaders is viewed by Hendricks and Ntsebeza (1999) as being based on political 
"expedience" rather than "principle", as the ANC sought to create a chasm among chiefs 
themselves and prevent a likely conservative alliance between chiefs and the National 
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Paliy. This alliance does not mean that the division within the ANC over this question 
was over. The division continlled[ s 1 to find expression in various official positions of the 
organisation. In the late 1980s ambivalence about the position of traditional leaders was 
--'" -
evident in the ANC. For example, the organisation in its constitutional guidelines issued 
in 1988 argued that: 
The institution of hereditary rulers and chiefs shall be transformed to serve 
the interests of the people as a whole in conformity with the democratic 
principles embodied in the constitution (cited in Bekker, 1993). 
It is statements like these that served to create an impression that the ANC was going to 
maintain the institution of traditional leaders after the demise of apartheid - a position 
that, as Oomen (2000) observes, went counter to the general belief held in struggle circles 
that "chiefs would disappear with the apartheid government to make place for the organs 
of the people's power". The ambivalence of the ANC regarding its thinking about the 
future of the institution of traditional leadership is clearer from the following passage: 
~ .> 
In assessing the role chiefs and traditional leaders can play in the 
. democratisation process they should be viewed as leaders in their 
communities who are perceived by their fellow villagers as men and women , 
of authority, who have used wealth, heredity or personal magnetism to gain 
positions of influence. Some of them might have been appointed to their 
present positions by the apartheid regime and are view by the populace as 
collaborators lacking any semblance of legitimacy. These will most 
probably lack the necessary initiative needed in the transformational 
process before it even begins. 
Others might have been removed form office because of their patriotic 
attachment and participation in the anti-apartheid struggle. Despite that 
they might still be regarded in high esteem by their communities and 
considered legitimate. Through them many people's attitude might be 
changed and therefore they might be the key to the hearts of millions, 
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influencing local and regional politics and also the shaping of major 
decisions while forming a vital link with the people at grassroots level 
(Skweyiya, 1993: 7). 
, 
~ , '.., -
Here Zola Skweyiya manages to reflect the division within the ANC over the future 
position of traditional leaders in the new South Af11ca. Obviously, ANC comrades 
belonging to the two camps of thought cannot hold a similar position regarding the future 
of traditional leaders. Against this background offundarnental difference, it is fascinating 
for the analyst to scrutinise the ~ost-a?.artheid politico-constitutional dispensation vis-a-
vis the institution of traditional leadership 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter sought to look into the role that the institution of traditional leaders has 
played in historical context. Three epochs of South Africa's political developments have 
been the primary focus of tills chapter, viz. the pre-colonial era, the colonial period and 
' " the period epoch of the apartheid regime. The chapter also discussed the relationship of 
the ANC and the institution of traditional leaders through out these stages. 
) 
i 
In pre-colonial era South Africa, like most African polities, dived into smaller polities 
under traditional leaders. The leaders were responsible for the general well-being of their 
polities - a responsibility that earned them the status of being fathers of their societies. 
The bond between the people and traditional leaders was very strong in that traditional 
leaders touched almost all aspect of the people's lives. 
50 
" . ~ 
.. 
The advent of colonialism dented the integrity of traditional leaders by subordinating then 
the colonial government. Thus the bond between the people and traditional leaders was 
:..; "\-
weakened as the colonial government used traditional leaders as an instrument of through 
which they could dominate the indigenous people of South Africa. 
The apartheid government deepened the instrumentalisation of traditional leaders by 
using them as a bulwark for institutionalised tribalism in the form of the Bantustan 
system of government. This development corrupted the most traditional leaders and thus 
served to strain relations between the ANC as traditional leaders came to be viewed as 
part of the enemy (apartheid). 
On the whole, the evolution of the institution of traditional leadership - from the pre-
colonial era to apartheid - has been a process moving from bad to worse. It is a process 
that has been characterised by successful attempts to use the institution of traditional 
leaders to subjugate their own people to a force of exogenous origin. Given this picture, 
! 
it is important to look at the position of traditional leaders in post-apartheid South Africa. 
, 
/ 
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---Chapter 3---
Traditional leaders in Post-apartheid South Africa 
:J '.., _ 
3.1 Introduction 
The historic democratic breakthrough that the people of South Africa have scored on 27 
April 1994 was bound to have its own implications for traditional leaders in the country. 
As the institution has spanned different epochs of undemocratic rule and has, as a matter 
of fact, been used to entrench despotic regimes, it was clear that the institution had to 
expect fundamental changes in relation to its position and role in the new democratic 
dispensation. The question however is: what are those changes? 
This chapter seeks to discuss post-apartheid South Afiica in relation to the position of 
traditional leaders. It will deal with the legislative framework of the democratic 
dispensation vis-a-vis the institution of traditional leadership. 
t "" 
3.2 Post-1994: Conflicting opinions on traditional leaders' positions 
.' 
{ 
With the somewhat unflowery role that traditional leaders had played during apartheid 
and colonialism, it is not surprising for some people to have expected no place for the 
institution of traditional leadership in post-apartheid South Africa. It is for this reason that 
Myers (1999) observes "one could have confidently expected that it would have been 
speedily done away with by South Africa's first post-apartheid, ANC-led government". 
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This line of thought, however, has not been without its critics. Some critics thought this 
view was extremist and cautioned against the exclusion of traditional leaders from 
modem systems of governance, especially at local level. In this direction, Ogunna argues 
that: 
Any local government system that fails to take into foll account local interests 
and aspirations and the traditional political organisation of the people is 
doomed to failure (cited in Nwomonoh, 1994). 
The view that traditional leaders need not be done way with also found support in ANC 
circles, although the need to tran~form).he institution of traditional leaders so as to bring 
it into line with democratic principles was emphasized. It is against this background that 
Skweyiya (1993) argued that: 
One of the main facets of democratisation will be how to design appropriate 
institutions which will among other things serve to thwart an array of 
undemocratic impulses that are likely to bedevil the post apartheid society. At 
the same time these institutions should command legitimacy among the people 
they serve. 
However, it does not seem clear, from the argument of those who propose that the 
institution <;If traditional leaders be retained, as to how it should be incorporated into the 
governance structures of post-apartheid South Africa. Perhaps this question could be 
, 
responded to by analysing how the institution is located within the constitutional 
framework of the democratic dispensation. 
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3.3 The constitution 
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The position that the post-1994 constitutional dispensation gives traditional leaders can 
be understood in the context of the mUltiparty negotiations of the early 1990s. In tills 
regard, three points flowing from resolution 34 of the National Negotiating Council are 
necessary for analysis: 
a) Traditional authorities shall co7-ztinue to exercise their functions in terms of 
indigenous law as prescribed and regulated by enabling legislation. 
b) There shall be an elected local government which shall take political 
responsibility for the provision of services in its area ofjurisdiction. 
c) The (hereditary) traditional leaders within the area of jurisdiction of a local 
authority shall be ex officio members of the local government (cited in 
Hendricks and Ntsebeza, 1999). 
These points are crucial to the understanding of the subsequent constitutional provisions 
that deal with the question of the institution of traditional leadership. The constitutional 
expression of the first point is embodied in the recognition that the South African 
f f 
constitution of 1996 gives to the institution of traditional leadership. Section 211 (1) 
reads thus: ;'The institution, status and role of traditional leadership, according to 
i 
customaJY law are recognised, subject to the Constitution ." It is clear that tills Section 
flows from point (a) of Resolution 34, as reflected above, in that both of these provisions 
rest on the recognition of the institution of traditional leadership, but subject to 
legislation. The subjection of the recognition of the institution to legislation is the sticky 
part, or perhaps the oversight of traditional leaders at the negotiations. What is interesting 
to note is the fact that the said legislation to which the existence of traditional leadersillp 
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is subjected is no longer a product of a trade-off between politicians and traditional 
leaders as it was the case at the negotiations, but mainly an affair of politicians. For 
example, h·aditional leaders had no veto influence over the parliamentary processes 
-~ '., -
leading to the adoption of the final constitution. Statutorily, politicians were better-placed 
to take charge of the process leading to the adoption of the constitution as they are the 
ones who had the final powers to adopt the constitution. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that Contralesa later challenged the very constitutional provision recognising the 
institution of traditional leadership, arguing that: 
The provisions of customary law and the bill of rights should be placed on 
an equal footing, which means they should be interpreted in as harmonious 
a manner as possible. Only when an irreconcilable conflict occurs, should 
the provisions of the bill of rights be binding on all. The bill of rights should 
therefore state explicitly that all its provisions should be interpreted in a 
manner that respects, upholds and furthers the interests and beliefs of 
customary law. (cited in Keulder, 1998) 
Here Contralesa demonstrated greater awareness of the fact that subjecting the institution 
of traditional leadership to the constitution implies that the whole institution will thus be 
required to' operate subject to the bill of rights - a scenario that would render most 
principles of customary law unlawful. At issue here is the loci of power in terms of what 
) 
;' 
prevails between the political system, which is based on modem democratic principles on 
the one hand and the traditional system of leadership based on principles that (as shown 
in chapter one) are not so congruent with modem democracy, on the other hand. For 
Section 211 (1) to subject the life of the institution of traditional leadership to the 
constitution is a clear indication that modem democracy supersede traditional rule. On 
closer analysis, it would appear that the SUbjection of the institution of traditional is not 
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an accident, but an orchestrated move by the ANC to impose transformation on the 
institution. As observed earlier, the ANC argued for the need to make the institution 
compatible with democracy. This is also evident in the Department of Local and 
- 4 '''\ 
Provincial Govemment's vision statement on the institution of traditional leaders. In the 
vision statement the department, inter alia, calls for the transformation of the institution 
of traditional leaders into an institution that provides " . . . for an institution, which is in 
harmony with the Constitution and the Bill of Rights" (Department of Local and 
Provincial Government, 2000). Indeed, if the institution of traditional leadership were to 
be brought into line with the Constitutr~n and the Bill of Rights this would clearly have 
the effects of democratising the institution, as the Constitution is based on democratic 
values. Reading from this, it would appear that the subjection of the institution to the 
Constitution is an attempt to impose transformation on the institution of traditional 
leaders. 
Section 212 (2) (a) of the constitution provides for the creation of houses of traditional 
leaders at g.oth national and provincial levels. The role of these houses is to advice the 
legislature on matters relevant to issues of tradition and customary law. The roots of this 
J 
kind of a set-up seem to be in the early organisational arrangement of the ANC where 
traditional leaders had their special house within the organisation. What seem to have 
been adjusted, though, are the powers of the houses - as the then house of traditional 
leaders in the ANC possessed more powers (Mzala, 1988). 
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The fact that in the new constitutional dispensation traditional leaders are given an 
advisory status stands in sharp contrast to the defunct homeland system where traditional 
leaders used to wield more powers than elected representatives by numerically 
-J ." 
dominating all the fonner Bantustan legislatures (Ntsebeza, 2000). It can be said 
therefore that the cun'ent constitutional order has overturned power relations between 
politicians and traditional leaders in favour of politicians. Effectively, traditional leaders, 
at provincial and national levels, do not have power. Bennet, (1998) makes the following 
observation about the powers ofthe houses of traditional leaders: 
.. . the new organs have only limited powers. They may propose legislation; 
they cannot generate statutes of their own accord. They may advice and they 
may insist on being consulted about bills concerning customary law, but 
they can do no more than delay the passing of an act. 
This arrangement has seen traditional leaders crossmg swords with politicians. The 
feeling of most traditional leaders is that on matters that concern them they should have 
the final say - meaning that they need to have veto power on these issues (Keulder, 
1998). Disa,greement over this provision has also served to strain the renewed relations 
between the ANC and traditional leaders, triggering some traditional leaders to move 
from the ANC to join other political organisations (like the United Democratic 
Movement) that have opportunistically taken advantage of the grievances of traditional 
leaders 
The constitution gives expression to point (b) of Resolution 34 (as reflected above) by 
providing for the creation of local government structures across the country (see chapter 
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seven of the Constitution). However, the constitution (as it elaborates on local 
goverrunent stmctures) neither mentions the institution of traditional leadership nor its 
position within these structures of local government. This does not only do injustice to 
. , 
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point (c) of Resolution 34, but also leaves traditional leaders in an awkward situation as 
their role at local government level remains undefined. Thus, an impression is created 
that traditional leaders are, at this level, dispensable such that they do not deserve a 
special mention in the elaboration oflocal government. 
3.4 Other legislative frameworks ct'ealing with the position of traditional leaders 
Hendricks and Ntsebeza (1999) contend that, "the confusion and lack of understanding of 
functions. powers. roles. processes and procedures. feeds into the tensions between 
elected councillors and traditional authorities". This argument presupposes that the 
functions, powers, roles, processes and procedures are clear - only that traditional leaders 
and elected councillors have no understanding of these. The question therefore is: is there 
a legislativy .frarnework clarifying these processes? The Municipal Structures Act No. 
117 of 1998 springs to mind once a question related to a local government legislative 
, 
framework is posed. The Act basically deals with the categorisation of municipalities - a 
matter that is not necessarily the focus of this study. However, the Act does cursorily 
touch on issues related to the participation/interaction between elected local government 
structures and the institution of traditional leadership. Regarding this, the Act says: 
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... traditional authorities that traditionally observe a system of customwy law in 
the area of a municipality, may participate through their leaders ... in the 
proceedings of a municipality ... (Independent Projects Tmst, 2002) 
-J ', _ 
This provision seems to open doors for traditional leaders to take part in the processes of 
municipalities and ipso facto influence issues at local government level through 
municipal structures. However, it is important to shed some light on the meaning of 
participation as conceptualised by the Act, as the issue of participation is one of the bones 
of contention in as far as traditiGnal l~~ders are concerned. The nature of participation 
would then clarify questions of power; who wields more power between traditional 
leaders and elected councillors? According to the Act, participation means that: 
.. . one could address a meeting; the traditional leader is therefore not 
merely a silent observer of proceedings. She/he may, subject to the rules and 
orders of the municipality ... participate in any debate on a matter if she/he 
is a councillor. This would include the right to submit motions, make 
proposals and ask questions. 
, f 
Unfortunately, this provision does not address the concerns of traditional leaders in that 
the Act, at the same time, prohibits representation oftraditionalleaders at these municipal , 
/ 
structures to be less than ten per cent of a particular council. This therefore means that the 
Act deliberately promotes a climate where elected councillors out-number traditional 
leaders and thus making the situation propitious for councillors to influence the 
proceedings of municipal councils more than traditional leaders. So the definitional 
clarity that the Act attempt to address does not seem to be of any substantial value as far 
as traditional leaders are concerned. Furthennore, this provision has some curtailing 
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effect on the participation of traditional leaders, in that it opens up participation "in allY 
debate on a matter" only if the participant-traditional leader is a cow1cillor. The fact that 
traditional leaders, according to the Act are not allowed to vote is also one of the 
... ~-
aggravating trammels in the way of traditional leaders as far as their participation in 
municipal councils is concerned, 
As pointed out earlier, this Act mainly seeks to deal with the categorisation of municipal 
structures, not the role of traditional leaders within these structures, hence the 
- ~. ' . 
conspicuous elision of the latter subject. The Department of Provincial and Local 
Government (DPLG) indicated its seriousness about addressing the position of traditional 
leaders in 2000 by releasing a discussion docwnent that specifically addresses itself to the 
institution of traditional leadership. This discussion document is very important for this 
research as it puts its fingers squarely on the role of traditional authorities in local 
government. In an attempt to create some clarity on this subject, the discussion document 
invokes the White Paper on Local government. · The following are the functions of 
traditionalj.eaders, according to the White Paper: 
I 
• Actirig as head of the traditional authority, and as such exercising limited 
legislative power and certain executive powers 
• Presiding over customary law courts and maintaining law and order 
• Consulting with traditional communities through imbizollekgotla 
• Assisting members of the community in their dealings with the state 
• Advising government on traditional affairs through the houses of traditional 
leaders 
• Convening meetings to consult with communities on the needs and priorities 
and providing information 
• Protecting cultural values and instilling a sense of community in their areas 
• Being the spokespersons of their communities 
• Being symbols of unity in the community 
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• Being custodians and protectors of the community's customs and general 
welfare 
Specifically, the role of traditional leaders in the development of the local government 
-.. ~ -
area and community is said to be: 
• Making recommendations on land allocation and the settling of land 
disputes 
• Lobbying government and other agencies for the development of their areas 
• Ensuring that the traditional community participates in decisions on 
development and contributes to development costs 
• Considering and making. recOJnmendations to authorities on traditional 
licences in their areas in accordance with the law. 
Whether or not these functions are ideally correct is a question that will be dealt with at 
length in the next chapter. For, now attention will be focused on the practical implications 
of the above functions as provided for by the White Paper. Some of these functions are 
not a source of contention as far as traditional leaders are concerned. The provision that 
traditional leaders should exercise limited legislative and executive roles is one of those 
that infuriate traditional leaders. They think that this provision strips them of effective 
powers and thus reduces them to a mere ceremonial status. This led Hendricks and 
Ntsebeza (l~99) to conclude that traditional leaders are "trying to resuscitate a form of 
I 
Bantu Authorities where they are primary instruments oflocal government". 
Perhaps a bone of contention is on the role of traditional leaders in development issues. 
As it can be seen, the White Paper seems to favour a situation where traditional leaders 
are considered on issues of development as mainly advisors to the government and 
mobilisers of their people to support government's developmental projects. This does not 
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go down well with traditional leaders as they think that local councillors have usurped 
their powers. Actually, the source of this dis empowerment of traditional leaders is the 
constitution as it assigns a developmental responsibility to elected local government 
structures (see chapter seven of the Constitution). This tempers with what traditional 
leaders see as their rightful role. For example, it is said that, "Under African tribal law, 
the custody of the land in entrusted to the king as the head of the entire traditional 
authority and his councillors ... " (Independent Project Trust, 2002: 99). Therefore, most 
traditional leaders view the fact that the White Paper gives traditional leaders an advisory 
status on issues of land allocation as 'anathema. Dabengwa (1998), for example, argue 
that, "The traditional chief is inextricably tied to the land. He cannot be a leader if he has 
no land to preside over". If traditional leaders are tied to the land, it would mean 
therefore that taking away their powers to allocate land is tantamount to demolishing the 
foundations of their being leaders. 
So, what are the overall implications that the White paper has for traditional leaders? As 
pointed out!!;lbove, some of the provisions of the White Paper (such as traditional leaders 
being symbols of communal unity; convening community meetings; being custodians of 
the culture of their communities, etc) are not really problematic, as they do not touch on 
issues of power. Basically, the White paper has adverse implications insofar as it reduces 
traditional leaders to an advisory status on matters of land allocation. The fact that 
traditional leaders are called upon by the White Paper to lobby government also serves to 
reduce traditional leaders to a status of an interest group - meaning that they are not part 
of government but just a lobby group. A lobby group has no control over the resources of 
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the lobbied (government in this case). It can only get its interests through only if 
government decides to become positive about the demand made by the lobby group . The 
government has the powers and rights to disregard whatever demands any lobby groups 
- ti. '.~ _ 
makes. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter sought to analyse the position of the institution of traditional leaders in post-
- ~ . . 
apartheid South Africa. It is clear from the analysis that the role that traditional leaders 
play in the current dispensation has been crafted out of a conflict of opinions. 
Considering the extent of the anti-chief attitude that characterised the ANC during the 
apartheid era (as it has been shown in chapter two), the new constructional order appears 
to be a serious compromise on the part of the ANC and a major achievement to 
traditional leaders, as the current constitution recognises the latter's existence. However, 
traditional leaders have a lot to cry for as the constitution has effectively striped them of 
the powers ,they used to wield during the homeland system. The institution of traditional 
leadership is integrated into the current politico-constitution order at a level bellow that 
of elected p·~liticians. At both provincial and national levels, traditional leaders are 
basically advisors of politicians - a role they resent strongly. 
The substantial reduction of the powers of traditional leaders has not left the local 
govenunent untouched. The constitution strengthens the position of elected councillors 
by providing that democratically elected local government structures must take political 
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responsibility for development issues. This has effectively driven traditional leaders out 
of the process that used to be basically theirs in the colonial and apartheid eras. Existing 
legislation also serves to disempower traditional leaders by giving them a ceremonial role 
:J .", _ 
to play at local government level. 
It can be said, on the whole, that the current government tried under difficult 
circumstance to incorporate an institution that is not really compatible with democracy 
into constructional rule. However, issues of power between traditional leaders and 
politicians continue to push the government into war with traditional leaders. It is for this 
reason that different propositions regarding the position of traditional leaders will be dealt 
with in the next chapter. 
,. 
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---Chapter 4---
Pragmatic coexistence 
4,} Introduction 
As it has been shown in the previous chapter, there is disagreement over the manner in 
which the institution of traditional leadership is integrated into the governance structures 
of post-apartheid South Africa. As a result, divergent proposals are put forward in terms 
- -" 
of the role that the institution should play in a democratic framework. This chapter 
analyses some of the proposals made in this regard with the aim to ultimately propose a 
way forward. 
4.2 Can traditional leaders be politicians at the same time? 
The issue of whether traditional leaders should be allowed to be politicians while holding 
their traditio~a1 positions at the same time is a conundrum. Rendering it even more 
vexing is the fact that traditional leaders themselves are divided over the issue. However, 
.' 
I 
a majority of them think that traditional leaders should not be prevented from actively 
taking part in politics. This view is clearly articulated by Contralesa in its argument that: 
Traditional leaders have the right to put their names forward for the 
election to public office, provided that once they are elected, they must 
vacate their pOSition as traditiol1alleaders. (cited in Keulder, 1998) 
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This argument is in line with Section 19 (3) (b) of the constitution guaranteeing all 
citizens the right to stand for election at all levels of government. The implication of this 
-is that traditional leaders can join political parties of their choice under whose name they 
. , 
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would like to campaign for election. 
The question therefore is: what should happen to traditional leaders who stand for 
election and lose? According to Contra1esa, such traditional leaders should be allowed to 
retain their positions as traditional leaders. The silence of the constitution in this regard 
seems to concur with Contarlesa's position. It would seem that the reason why the 
constitution is silent on this matter is because of the fact that it does not discriminate the 
country's citizens in as far as standing for election is concerned. On closer analysis, this 
situation appears to have severe implications for the integrity of the institution of 
traditional leadership. It promotes a situation where the institution of traditional 
leadership would be entangled in the web of politics and thereby subjected it to an abuse 
by both opportunistic traditional leaders and politicians. Some traditional leaders could 
use the institution of traditional leadership to promote a political party to which they are 
affiliated. If such traditional leaders lose election, they would then go back to their 
positions as.traditionalleaders. 
In this context, it is extremely difficult to draw a distinction between a traditional leader 
and a politician. Furthennore, people can no longer see a traditional leader who has lost 
election as someone who transcends political barriers, as it will have been clear to them 
that this particular traditional leader is a member of that particular political party. What 
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this means is that people would now be divided over their traditional leader. In this case it 
would not only be the integrity of the traditional leader concerned on the line, but also the 
integrity of the institution of traditional leadership as a whole. Besides, allowing 
, 
..... . .., -
traditional leaders to actively participate in politics fertilises the ground for political 
parties to fight over traditional leaders. It is for this reason that Professor Thabo Sebela 
observes that: 
.. . if you as a ruling party try to leave traditional leaders out of politics, 
some parties go for them and us.!! them against you. They even promise them 
bigger powers if they take·over (cited in IPT, 2002:62). 
It would appear that the best way to avert this quagmire would be for the constitution to 
strictly prohibit traditional leaders from participating in politics by affiliating to political 
organisations and standing for election at any level of government. Some may argue that 
this would amount to unfair discrimination. No, it won't be as the institution of traditional 
leadership is a distinct system ofleadership as opposed to the political one. In this context 
their traditional leaders will have a choice to make: either they remain traditional leaders 
! 
or become politicians. If they chose to remain traditional leaders they will be treated as 
such by the cpnstitntion, but ifthey chose the political path they would have to be treated 
/ 
like any other politician. The question of how do they influence government policies 
while insulated from active politics - as it appears to be one of their central concerns -
will be dealt with later. 
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4.3 Traditional leaders as sources of communal unity. 
Having been insulated from active politics, the institution of traditional leadership would 
:J "~_ 
serve as a source of communal unity. It would then be possible for people to view the 
institution as a credible instrument of unity that cuts across party political lines thus 
bringing the people together on matters of cultural importance. As Hammond-Tooke 
(1962) observes, the chief in pre-colonial African communities was the embodiment of 
the culture of the community. Thus if chiefs involve themselves in politics they would be 
- ." 
compromising this important role. Realistically, traditional leaders need to understand 
that it is not possible to go back to the "good old days" where they used to be the sole 
bearers of all political power. They need to appreciate the fact that modem democracy is 
a reality of contemporary times. It is for this reason that Govan Mbeki argued that when 
people have developed to a certain stage that discards certain institutions "to force them is 
not liberation but enslavement" (cited in Mzala, 1988). Escaping this enslavement is not 
impossible. It takes a conscious decision informed , by honesty. As Ndebele (1972) aptly 
argues: I.··· 
, 
cds toms and culture are man-made. therefore they can be changed 
according to whether man continues to find value in them. ... When 
customs no longer cater for proper development of adequate human 
expression. they should be removed. 
In the same vein, the institutional expression of customs and social values can never be 
developments in society. Therefore, if traditional leaders insist that their institution of 
leadership must have the powers it used to wield in pre-colonial era that would be 
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tantamount to being impervious to change. However, to suggest some change in the 
expression and expression of the customs is not to suggest that the institution of 
traditional leadership must cease to exist. As Skweyiya (1993: 8) observes the institution 
-J ',,_ 
will continue to exist. 
4.4 The need to transcend ethnicity 
South Africa is a multi ethnic society. This reality has been abused first, by the colonial 
government and later by the apartheid regime. While the liberation movement worked 
arduously to bridge ethnic frontiers that served to weaken the unity of the South African 
people, the apartheid regime, on the other hand consistently engineered strategies to 
cement the tribal divide so as to ensure that the African majority do not constitute a 
formidable united force against the regime. As Mamdani (1996: 90) observes, the 
colonial and apartheid regimes saw tribalism as an instrument that would dissolve the 
majority into several tribal minorities and thus ·substantially reducing their political 
strength. f > 
, 
UnfortunateI"y, as it has been shown in chapter one, chiefs were used in cementing ethnic 
division. Inevitably, traditional leaders had to be seen by forces of African unity as a 
major hindrance and thus an enemy. It is for this reason that Mzala (1988: 40) argues 
that: 
... the enemy of the Afi'ican people has since those days been identified 
primarily as one who attempted to counter this feeling of fellowship and 
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brotherhood among the people, by sowing seeds of disunity whether based 
on tribalism, regionalism or other factors. 
It is understandable, therefore, that traditional leaders were generally looked at as the 
planters of disunity among the African people. One of the biggest challenges that 
confronted the new South African democratic regime after 1994 was the issue of nation 
building. This meant that the South African society needed to rebuild the necessary 
bridges to facilitate ethnic integration so as to demolish the tribal edifice created by 
colonialism and apartheid over a long period of domination. Although the constitution of 
- .' . 
the country provides a good framework for nation building, it would be unrealistic to 
conclude that the goal of nation building has now been fully attained. Neither would it be 
correct to conclude that the feeling that traditional leadership epitomises tribalism is no 
more in South Africa today. Most people still see traditional leaders as constituting a 
serious threat to the efforts of building a united post-apartheid South Africa. It is for this 
reason that Skweyiya (1993: 9) warned that, "The democratic process should not be 
allowed to be subverted by the demands of ethnic identity". 
The view that some traditional leaders still serve to fuel ethnic divisions does not seem to 
be far-fetch€d. As Tom Lodge (2001) observes, some Shangan traditional leaders tried to 
mobilise people of Malamulele in Limpopo Province not to agree to be incorporated into 
the Greater Thohoyandou municipality whose administration was perceived to be an 
affair of the Bavhenda people. In this light, it would appear that the call by traditional 
leaders that their role should be defined clearer than it is in the current constitutional 
dispensation must begin with themselves coming to grips with the fact that things have 
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changed in the country today. They need to deal with the challenge of transcending ethnic 
divisions and become part of the broader process of nation building. 
It is imperative for traditional leaders to be seen to be promoting ethnic tolerance and 
integration without necessarily having to compromise the cultural identity of their people. 
Striking a balance between nation building and cultural identity is a delicate balance 
traditional leaders must demonstrate willingness to do. This is not an impossible exercise. 
As Thomson argues, ethnic loyalty is not necessarily antagonistic to national integration 
(cited in Nwomonoh, 1994). If traditional leaders do not rise to this challenge, their 
relevance to the current democratic order will justifiably be questionable. 
4.5 The role of traditional leaders in government 
As it has been shown earlier, the way in which traditional leaders are fitted into the 
current jigsaw of the South Africa's governance system has forced politicians and 
traditionaldeaders to lock horns with each other. A meticulous analysis of this conflict 
reveal that traditional leaders are not satisfied with the current status quo in terms of 
" power relations. The question, therefore, is: is there a way other than the current 
constitutional arrangement to locate the role of traditional leaders? 
I 
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4.5.1 the national and provincial level 
The national and provincial levels of government are surely strategic tiers of govemance . 
. , 
~ ... . .,-
These are the levels from which important decisions affecting the life of the country and 
the provinces are taken. Given the strategic importance of these levels, it is 
understandable why it is proper for traditional leaders be represented so as to exert some 
influence over government policy at the two levels. The kemel of contestation is how to 
define the kind of influence traditional leaders need to exert and how they should go 
about doing that. As it has been·shown earlier, traditional leaders are not discontented 
with the existence of houses of traditional leaders as the lever through which they can 
influence policy at both national and provincial levels. They are primarily concerned with 
the powers that these houses have. It is for this reason that Contralesa proposes that, 
The powers of the provincial Houses of Traditional Leaders should in 
general be strengthened and expanded - the same applies to the National 
Council of Traditional Leaders. The fact' that the houses ... have only 
advisory powers and that their advice can be ignored by the provincial 
legislature and parliament, undermines their credibility and legitimacy. The 
. respective Houses of Traditional Leaders should at least have a veto 
regarding those matters pertaining to the powers and functions of rural 
local ,governments, the demarcation of rural areas, the organisation of 
district councils and matters that directly affect the culture, customary laws, 
communal land, conventions and usages of communities served by 
traditional authorities (cited in Keulder, 1998). 
Clearly, this is a matter of power. What the proposal implies is that traditional leaders 
must be given legislative powers on matters that concem them. If they have veto powers, 
as Contralesa proposes, it would mean that no bill would be pass into law without their 
approval, which effectively gives them law-making powers. This would have far reaching 
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implications for the entire legislature as it would practically mean that legislative powers 
would be split into two so as to create a situation where traditional leaders make their 
own law independent of politicians. , If traditional leaders are not given law-making 
powers on relevant matters but only veto powers, this would lead to an impasse where the 
houses of traditional leaders and politicians hold sharply divergent positions, The 
question would be: where to go form here? Who has the authority to prevail? The logical 
recourse in this case would appear to be the court, but even then the court would not have 
the competence to resolve the impasse, as it cannot intervene to make law, Thus, it would 
appear that getting out of such a quagmire would almost be impossible as it seems that 
the only solution would be when either politicians or the houses of traditional leaders 
have a final say over the bill in question. If traditional leaders prevail that would occur to 
the dissatisfaction of politicians and, as such, the conflict between them and traditional 
leaders would inevitably be a political matter - meaning that traditional leaders would 
thus have entered the political fray. This therefore would imply the politicisation of the 
institution of traditional leadership, Against this background, it does not seen to be an . 
ideal situaiion for the houses of traditional leaders both at national and provincial level to 
have veto power. Thus it seems reasonable for the houses to only have advisory powers. 
, 
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4.5.2 the local government level 
The local government is one level of governance that causes a deep sense of unease for 
traditional leaders. This is more so because traditional leaders, historically, have 
considered local government to be their exclusive telTain in rural South Africa. As it has 
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been demonstrated in chapter three, the creation of local govemment structures 
throughout the country has adversely impacted on the powers and functions of traditional 
leaders. This led traditional leaders to think that their role has been usurped by elected 
~ " \-
local govermllent structures. It is for this reason that traditional leaders continue to call 
for the redefinition of their role in local government. 
There are a number of possible concepts regarding the location of traditional leaders in 
local government. It is possible, for example, to have a system of local government 
where traditional leaders have more powers than elected structures. Articulating this kind 
of system, Zungu (1996) argues that elected councillors' main task should be to support 
the induna. Here traditional leaders are above elected cOlll1cillors. However, it is not 
clear, under this system, why elected councillors are necessary as traditional leaders 
could simply appoint supporters of their own choice instead of having to rely on 
politicians for support. Furthermore, there does not seem to exist a convmcmg 
motivation why traditional leaders should be above politicians. It would seem that this 
kind of a ~ystem is not sustainable as politicians may not always be supportive of 
traditional leaders and thus could rebel against traditional leaders. 
t 
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One other option would be to have traditional leaders completely subordinated to elected 
structures, meaning that they would need to account to politicians for whatever they do 
and thus politicians reserving the right to determine the life of traditional leaders. Here 
the existence oftlle institution of traditional leadership would be absolutely redundant, as 
politicians would have the power to get rid of it and supplant if they so wish. 
74 
" . 
,. 
The question remains: what kind of concept is ideal to serve as a good framework for the 
existence of the institution of traditional leadership within a democratic environment at a 
-~ .~ -
local level? Responding to this question requires a clear identification of the significance 
of the institution of traditional leadership in society. It is such significance that should 
inform attempts to locate the institution within local government structures. Many things 
are said about the role of the institution of traditional leadership in society, but what 
appears to be central is the idea that the institution is the custodian of African culture 
traditions and customs as well as the source of communal unity (Mbeki, 2001; 
Nwomonoh, 1994; Naudascher and Kgatlhanye, 1997). It would seem reasonable, 
therefore, to suggest that the location of traditional leaders within local government must 
aim to ensure that they properly play this role. However, it would be improper to attempt 
defining the role that traditional leaders should play in local government without taking 
into cognisance the developmental backlog that post-apartheid South Africa is facing at 
this level. 
The advent of democracy has created expectations and hope on the part of rural people 
, 
that the new political order will act urgently to tackle the challenges of 
underdevelopment. It becomes less unclear, therefore, that developmental issues are 
largely political. The question thus becomes: can traditional leaders play the role of being 
tlle source of communal unity while at the same time handling political matters? Van 
Kessel and Oomen (1997: 585), for example, argue that: 
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If traditional leaders are perceived as 1101l-partisan they can playa valuable 
role ill the local communities, e.g. ill the sphere of conflict resolution and 
justice. 
It would appear from tills that it is not i4:al for traditional leaders to be charged with the 
responsibility of dealing with issues of development, as these issues are political. The 
political nature of the issues thus subjects them to political contestation. If traditional 
leaders were to enter this political fray, it would mean that the institution of traditional 
leadership is now politicised. Against this background, it would seem sensible for the 
integration of the institution ~f tr<l:d.itional leadership to be integrated into local 
government in a manner that disentangles the institution form the political web. This does 
not imply tile disempowerment of traditional leadership. It basically means that there 
must be some separation of powers or specialisation between politicians and traditional 
leaders. Traditional leaders, in this context, would specialise in matters of custom, culture 
and traditions while elected local politicians focus on matters of development. This 
would go a long way in resolving the conflict that characterises traditional leader-local 
councillor relationship almost all over the country. 
! ..... 
The severity of the conflict between politicians and traditional leaders at local 
J 
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goverrunent level has manifested it self in instances where traditional leaders tried to 
"keep municipalities hostage, together with all their plans for hospitals, housing projects 
or roads" by refusing to give land (Oomen, 2000: 66). This underscores the extent of the 
dangerous problems that ensue as a result of traditional leaders' involvement in political 
issues. One thing for sure is that mral people do want houses, hospitals, good roads, etc. 
So if traditional leaders block the implementation of programmes that are aimed at 
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bringing about development, they are likely to be portrayed as anti-development forces -
a perception that is not good for the image and integrity of the institution of traditional 
leadership. 
Considering the foregoing, it would appear that the proposal by Contralesa that, 
"Traditional authorities should in their capacity as rural local government, render 
services to individuals residing in their areas of jurisdiction ... " is not watertight as it 
pushes the institution of traditional leadership deep into the heart of politics (cited in 
-
Keulder, 1998). Furthermore, this proposal does not seem to address what Mamdani 
(1996) calls "the bifurcation of the state" created by the colonialism and apartheid. It 
appears like this proposal encourages the perpetuation of two systems of governance, the 
urban and the rural. 
Most likely, traditional leaders will reject the idea that they need to disengage from the 
apolitical and occupy a socio-cultural space, as this appears to take away the "political 
powers" they used to wield during apartheid. However, traditional leaders need to 
understand that it is important for them to do this if they are really serious about 
I 
safeguarding' the integrity of the institution, otherwise the institution will remain a 
political football and thus continually subjecting its existence to question. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed different proposals made regarding the role that the institution 
~ . ..,-
of traditional leaders should play in democratic South Africa. Out of the analysis, it 
appears that it would be good for the integrity of the institution of traditional leadership 
to be insulated from active politics and play a cultural role in society. Thus, the 
integration of the institution in governance structures - from local to national level -
should be geared towards ensuring that the institution properly serves this purpose. 
However, it is clear that this -cannot easily be attained without traditional leaders 
accepting the fact that the advent of democracy inevitably requires them to cede much of 
the powers they used to wield during apartheid to politicians. 
-' 
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---Chapter 5---
.C,onclusion 
S. Conclusion 
This study sought to investigate ways in which the institution of traditional leadership 
could be located within South Af!ica's .newconstitutional framework. The main objective 
was to contribute to the resolution of the ongoing conflict about the actual role that the 
institution should play in a democratic framework by proposing an alternative. 
For this investigation to be possible chapter one of the study had to first attend to the 
important question of whether or not the institution of traditional leadership is compatible 
with democracy. When this was done, chapter two then made a reflection of the 
historical context of the institution of traditional leadership. This reflection was necessary 
, . 
to inform chapter three, which dealt with the current state of affairs in terms of the 
manner in which the institution of traditional leadership is integrated into the 
I 
/ 
constitutional framework of democratic South Africa. · The problematic areas of the 
current dispensation vis-a-vis the institution of traditional leadership were also 
highlighted in chapter three. 
The discussion in chapter tlu'ee has been an important one in informing chapter four as 
this chapter discussed tile different proposition made in respect of what shonld be the 
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actual role of traditional leaders in post-apartheid South Africa. This discussion therefore, 
culminated in a recommendation of an altemative to the various propositions explored in 
this chapter. 
The findings of this study are that: 
• The pre-colonial era represents an epoch where the institution of 
traditional leadership can be said to be in its pristine form. This is so as 
this is the stage where traditional leaders were the only authority 
responsible for the leadership of African polities. Here traditional leaders 
provided leadership in most aspects of the lives of their subjects, for 
example, cultural religious, economic, etc. thus, the institution of 
traditional leadership embodied the life of society in general and thereby 
mirroring society's norms and values. For this reason, the nexus between 
the people and their leadership was very strong. 
~ .-.. 
• There was a drastic change in the above state of affairs occasioned by the 
.1 
I arrival of colonialists on the African continent. South Africa is one of the 
many African countries that came under the grip of British colonial rule. 
Thus it could not escape the policy of indirect rule that the British applied 
to their colonies on the African continent and beyond. This policy was 
based on the philosophy that the colonised indigenous peoples could be 
best governed through their own institutions. The first application of this 
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policy in South African was in the mid-nineteenth centaury when Sir 
Theophilus Shepstone experimented it in Natal. The policy was later 
given concrete expression through the passage of the Native Authorities 
... ,~ -
Act of 1927 where the institution of traditional leadership was made to be 
accountable to the colonial government. This had adverse implications for 
the integrity of the institution and its relationship to the people it served. 
The institution of traditional leadership no longer had to advance the 
interests of the indigenous peoples, but those of the colonisers. 
• The advent of apartheid in 1948 served to deepen the denting of the image 
of the institution of traditional leadership by creating a Bantustan system 
meant to solidify tribalism, with traditional leaders serving as the pillars of 
this system. The role that the institution of traditional leadership played 
during apartheid widened the gap between them and their people even 
further. As a result, traditional leaders increasingly became targets of anti-
! apartheid struggles as it became clear that most of them served as 
.' 
I 
instruments of the apartheid regime . 
• The fact that ascendancy to leadership is based on heredity puts the 
traditional system of leadership out of tune with democratic values in 
many respects. People who do not belong to the royal family are excluded 
because of this kind of procedure. As a result, it even becomes difficult to 
detennine the legitimacy of traditional leaders, as the system does not 
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provide a room for people to choose their leaders. Furthennore, the 
institution of traditional leadership is largely an exclusive preserve of 
males, notwithstanding the fact that there are a few communities that 
-J 'v,_ 
accommodate women in leadership. This constitutes a breach of the 
principle of equality on which democracy is based. The institution of 
traditional leadership also flouts this principle by creating propitious 
conditions for traditional leaders to use customary law in an unaccountable 
way and in a manner that promotes venality. 
• The undemocratic nature of the institution, coupled with its cooperative 
role under colonialism and apartheid partly explains why the ANC became 
ambivalent about the role of the traditional leaders in post-apartheid South 
Africa. An explanation of the general division of society over this matter 
can also be drawn fonn these circumstances. It is for this reason that the 
existence of the institution in the current constitutional dispensation is 
f ·· subjected to the constitution. In this sense, the institution of traditional 
leadership is compelled to base its existence on the democratic values 
t 
/ enshrined in the constitution. On the whole, the current constitutional 
framework substantially reduces the powers that traditional leaders used to 
have during apartheid, at all levels of government, by giving them an 
advisory role. It is for this reason that most traditional leaders are calling 
for the redefinition of their role and that their powers should be 
strengthened. 
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Despite the fact that the institution of traditional leadership is in character incompatible 
with democracy, it is still relevant to most South Africans, especially those who live in 
, 
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rural areas. Based on the findings of this study the following recommendations could be 
helpful in the efforts to locate the institution of traditional leadership in the new 
democratic South African: 
• Traditional leaders must not actively participate in politics, as that may not 
be good for the integrity of the institution of traditional leadership as a 
whole; 
• Traditional leaders should mainly focus their efforts on preserving the 
customs of their respective communities; 
• Traditional leaders must make efforts to transcend tribal/ethnic barriers 
! and contribute to nation building; 
,I 
• The institution of traditional leaders should make some strides to promote 
the participation of women; 
• The provisions of the Constitution in respect of both the national and 
provincial houses of traditional leaders should be respected, meaning that 
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traditional leaders should continue to play an advisory role at these levels 
of government; and 
.. 
-<II. -..,_ 
+ At local government level, the developmental role of democratically 
elected local government structures, as per chapter seven of the 
Constitution, should be respected. Traditional leaders should advise these 
structures on issues pertaining to culture, tradition and custom. 
In conclusion, this thesis respO!lds to the question of how best can the institution of 
traditional leadership be located within the institutional framework of South Africa's new 
democracy by proposing that the institution needs to be integrated in a manner that 
enables it to playa cultural role, thus leaving political matters to politicians. This will not 
only help politicians and traditional leaders unlock horns, but will also serve to strengthen 
the integrity of the institution of traditional leadership and thus put a stop to the continued 
questioning of its relevance in democratic South Africa. 
f ····· 
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